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I. Introduction 
Since July 1997, when Hong Kong was reunited with the 
People’s Republic of China, academics in the Special 
Administrative Region of Hong Kong have fiercely protected their 
right to engage in critical speech and practice academic freedom.  
They have been aided by Hong Kong’s regional constitution 
(known as the “Basic Law”), which incorporates international 
human rights treaties into domestic law and contains unusually 
detailed protections for freedom of expression, academic freedom, 
and educational autonomy.1  These constitutional provisions 
originated in the Sino-British Joint Declaration, a bilateral treaty 
that was duly registered with the United Nations.2  Nonetheless, 
this article documents a dramatic decline in academic freedom in 
Hong Kong since the last comprehensive study of the topic was 
published in 2006.3  This is partly because the Chinese Communist 
Party has made a concerted effort to punish Hong Kong academics 
and student organizations for their role in the Umbrella Movement 
and other pro-democracy movements.4  Equally important, there 
have been significant changes to the governance structure in Hong 
Kong’s universities over the past decade,5 creating overly-
centralized universities that are far too vulnerable to outside 
interference.  These developments have already damaged the 
 
 1 See XIANGGANG JIBEN FA [Hong Kong Basic Law] (promulgated by Order 
No.26, Pres. of China, Apr. 4, 1990, effective July 1, 1997), arts. 27, 34, 39, 136–7 
(1997) (H.K.) [hereinafter Basic Law] (although the Basic Law is a national law enacted 
by the National People’s Congress of the People’s Republic of China, it has the status of 
superior law in Hong Kong and is considered Hong Kong’s constitutional instrument); 
Albert H.Y. Chen, The Interpretation of the Basic Law – Common Law and Mainland 
Chinese Perspectives, 30 H.K.L.J. 380–81 (2000); see discussion infra Part III 
(analyzing the legal protections for free speech, academic freedom, and educational 
autonomy and the role of the independent judiciary in preserving Hong Kong freedoms; 
and the role of academics and students in critiquing the controversial “national security” 
bill). 
 2 Joint Declaration of the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland and the Government of the People’s Republic of China on the Question of 
Hong Kong, China-U.K., Dec. 19, 1984, 1399 U.N.T.S. 33 [hereinafter Joint Declaration]. 
 3 Compare Part V-VIII, infra, with JAN CURRIE, CAROLE J. PETERSEN, & KA-HO 
MOK, ACADEMIC FREEDOM IN HONG KONG (Lexington Books, 2006) (documenting 
challenges but concluding that Hong Kong academics generally still enjoyed academic 
freedom) [hereinafter ACADEMIC FREEDOM]. 
 4 See infra Part VI. 
 5 See infra Part IV. 
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quality and international reputation of Hong Kong’s universities,6 
which will ultimately hurt not only Hong Kong but also the 
People’s Republic of China. 
A British colony from 1842-1997, Hong Kong was returned to 
China in 1997 under the “one county, two systems” model, which 
was devised by Deng Xiaoping and originally intended to provide 
a model for reunification with Taiwan.7  Public opinion polls 
demonstrated that the majority of Hong Kong residents would 
have preferred to remain British or to become an independent city-
state.8  Although colonial Hong Kong was inherently 
undemocratic, the British had provided a common law legal 
system and certain traditions that facilitated civil liberties, 
including an independent judiciary.9  In contrast, the rule of law 
was (and still is) seriously lacking in mainland China.10 
In an effort to reassure the population, the Chinese and British 
governments made many promises in the Joint Declaration.  The 
treaty provides that Hong Kong will maintain its common law 
legal system and independent judiciary and enjoy a “high degree 
of autonomy” as a Special Administrative Region of China 
(“SAR”).11  It also promises that Hong Kong residents will 
continue to enjoy freedom of expression and that the territory will 
maintain its pre-existing educational system, protect academic 
 
 6 See infra Part VI. 
 7 See, e.g., Ma Ying-jeou: ‘One Country One System’, AL JAZEERA (Sept. 29, 
2014), http://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/talktojazeera/2014/09/ma-ying-jeou-an-
inexplicable-fear-201492613134516309.html [https://perma.cc/5Y72-97JX] (showing that 
while Taiwan is functioning as an independent nation, with its own military, it is highly 
unlikely that Taiwan would ever agree to unify with China under the “one country, two 
systems” model). 
 8 See JOSEPH Y.S. CHENG, HONG KONG IN SEARCH OF A FUTURE ch. 3 (Oxford 
Univ. Press 1984) (summarizing, among other surveys, a 1982 telephone survey 
reporting that 70% of respondents preferred to keep the status quo, 15% wanted Hong 
Kong to become a British “trust territory,” and only 4% preferred that Hong Kong be 
returned to China). 
 9 See Carole J. Petersen, From British Colony to Special Administrative Region of 
China: Embracing Human Rights in Hong Kong, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN ASIA: A 
COMPARATIVE LEGAL STUDY OF TWELVE ASIAN JURISDICTIONS, FRANCE, AND THE UNITED 
STATES (Randall Peerenboom, Carole J. Petersen & Albert H.Y. Chen eds., Routledge 2006) 
[hereinafter HUMAN RIGHTS IN ASIA] (on Hong Kong). 
 10 See id.; Randall Peerenboom, Human Rights in China, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN ASIA, 
supra note 9 (on Mainland China). 
 11 Joint Declaration, supra note 2, ¶¶ 3(2)–(3), Annex I, § III. 
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freedom, and make its own educational policies.12  In addition, 
China agreed that the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (the “ICCPR”), which was applied to Hong Kong by the 
British government, would continue to apply to Hong Kong, 
although China has yet to ratify the treaty.13  Similar provisions 
were repeated in the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special 
Administrative Region (“Basic Law”), Hong Kong’s regional 
constitution.14  The question is whether these protections work in 
practice, even when the central government and its allies may have 
a strong incentive to curtail critical speech in Hong Kong. 
In 2006, the first comprehensive study of academic freedom in 
Hong Kong concluded that academics had faced significant 
challenges since 1997, but that, on the whole, academic freedom 
was still very much alive.15  However, the study also reported that 
Hong Kong’s universities were undergoing significant 
“management reforms,” which were likely to leave the universities 
more centralized, less democratic, and thus more vulnerable to 
outside interference.16  This article demonstrates how, in the past 
decade, these changes have, indeed, made it far easier for the 
government and other external agents to influence decision-
making processes in the universities.  Meanwhile, relations 
between Hong Kong and Beijing have become increasingly tense 
 
 12 Id. ¶ 3(5); id. Annex I, §§ X, XIII. 
 13 Id. Annex I, § XIII; see also United Nations Treaty Collection, Ch. IV (4), 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (documenting that China has since 
signed the ICCPR, in 1998, but still has not ratified it and noting, at Endnote 6 to China, 
that the Covenant continued to apply to Hong Kong after China resumed exercising 
sovereignty over the territory), 
https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-
4&chapter=4&clang=_en [https://perma.cc/92TD-Q8QT] (last visited June 6, 2016). 
China also agreed that the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights would continue to apply to Hong Kong, but that treaty has had less impact than 
the ICCPR.  See Carole J. Petersen, Embracing Universal Standards? The Role of 
International Human Rights Treaties in Hong Kong’s Constitutional Jurisprudence, in 
INTERPRETING HONG KONG’S BASIC LAW: THE STRUGGLE FOR COHERENCE (Fu Hualing, 
Lison Harris & Simon N. M. Young eds., Palgrave Macmillan 2007) [hereinafter 
INTERPRETING HONG KONG’S BASIC LAW]. 
 14 Basic Law, supra note 1, arts. 27, 34, 39, 136–7. 
 15 ACADEMIC FREEDOM, supra note 3, at 145–55. 
 16 Id. at 153; see also Carole J. Petersen and Jan Currie, Higher Education 
Restructuring and Academic Freedom in Hong Kong, 6(5) POL’Y FUTURES IN EDUC. 589–98 
(2008) (documenting further changes in the governance and management structures after 
2006) [hereinafter Petersen & Currie, Higher Education]. 
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and pro-China forces have a greater incentive to interfere with 
academic freedom and critical speech.17   This is partly because 
Hong Kong residents have resisted proposals to introduce 
nationalism into the territory’s public schools but also because 
democracy activists—many of whom are associated with Hong 
Kong universities—have become more confrontational, as 
demonstrated by Occupy Central and the student-led Umbrella 
Movement in 2014.18  Pro-Beijing forces have retaliated, directly 
targeting certain academics and publishers in Hong Kong.19  In 
light of these developments, it is clearly time to reassess academic 
freedom and educational autonomy in the territory. 
Part II of the article begins by briefly summarizing the “one 
country, two systems” model, which provides extensive formal 
autonomy for the Hong Kong SAR but also places the reins of 
power primarily in the unelected executive branch.  Part III then 
analyzes the legal protections for free speech, academic freedom, 
and educational autonomy and the role of the independent 
judiciary in preserving Hong Kong’s freedoms.  It also analyzes 
the role of academics and students in critiquing the controversial 
“national security” bill, which was introduced in the local 
legislature in 2003 to implement Article 23 of the Basic Law but 
withdrawn after more than 500,000 people took to the streets.20 
Part IV of the article then shifts to the issue of university 
governance and its relationship to academic freedom.  It begins by 
briefly summarizing the “Robert Chung affair,” a covert attempt to 
restrict academic research in the early years following China’s 
resumption of sovereignty.21  This section demonstrates how the 
 
 17 See infra Part V. 
 18 Id. See also Elizabeth Barber & Charlie Campbell, Pro-Democracy Students 
Storm Government Square in Hong Kong, TIME (Sept. 27, 2014). 
 19 See infra Part VI. 
 20 Article 23 obligates the local Hong Kong legislature to enact legislation “on its 
own” prohibiting, inter alia, sedition, subversion, secession, and theft of state secrets. 
For a general introduction to Article 23 and the failed attempt to enact legislation 
implementing it, see Carole J. Petersen, Hong Kong’s Spring of Discontent: The Rise and 
Fall of the National Security Bill in 2003, in NATIONAL SECURITY AND FUNDAMENTAL 
FREEDOMS: HONG KONG’S ARTICLE 23 UNDER SCRUTINY ch. 1 (Fu Hualing, Carole J. 
Petersen & Simon N.M. Young eds., H.K. Univ. Press 2005) [hereinafter NATIONAL 
SECURITY AND FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS]. 
 21 See infra Part IV.  See also Carole J. Petersen, Preserving Academic Freedom in 
Hong Kong: Lessons from the “Robert Chung Affair,” 30 H.K.L.J. 165–76 (2000) 
[hereinafter Petersen, Lessons]. 
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Chief Executive’s ties to the University of Hong Kong’s Council 
weakened the Council’s response to the interference.  Subsequent 
changes to university governance have made Hong Kong’s 
universities even more vulnerable to interference. 
Part V then analyzes the escalating conflicts between the 
universities and pro-Beijing forces.  While many academics have 
actively studied and critiqued Hong Kong’s legal and political 
systems, some have moved beyond research and written advocacy 
and become activists in the human rights and democracy 
movements.22  Student organizations have also become 
increasingly confrontational, reflecting their frustration with the 
slow pace of democratic reform.23  Meanwhile, mainland Chinese 
tourists have begun to take advantage of Hong Kong’s free press 
and have obtained copies of publications that embarrass the 
Chinese Communist Party.24  All of these developments have 
increased the desire of the local and central governments to try to 
curtail critical speech in the territory.25 
As demonstrated in Part VI, Beijing and its allies have, indeed, 
embarked upon an overt campaign to punish and intimidate its 
critics in Hong Kong.  In 2015, the Council at the University of 
Hong Kong (“HKU”) (which is now dominated by external 
members who are loyal to the government) refused to confirm the 
appointment of the former Dean of the Faculty of Law to a high-
level administrative position.26  Other academics have also 
reported that they believe they have been targeted for less 
favorable treatment, either because of their research and public 
commentary or because of their political activities as private 
citizens.27 
Part VII then analyzes the most egregious threat to freedom of 
 
 22 See infra Part V.  See also Stephan Ortmann, The Umbrella Movement and Hong 
Kong’s Protracted Democratization Process, 46 ASIAN AFF. 32 (2015). 
 23 See, e.g., Siegfried Sin, The Source of Hong Kong Youth’s Frustration, S. CHINA 
MORNING POST (Dec. 12, 2014), http://www.scmp.com/comment/insight-
opinion/article/1661412/source-hong-kong-youths-frustration [https://perma.cc/6ZRU-
752J ]. 
 24 Chris Horton, In Hong Kong: A Sanctuary for Banned Books, ATLANTIC (Apr. 
10, 2012), http://www.theatlantic.com/china/archive/2013/04/in-hong-kong-a-sanctuary-
for-banned-books/274831/ [https://perma.cc/LNF6-7WTM]. 
 25 Id. 
 26 See infra Part VI. 
 27 Id. 
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expression in Hong Kong to date—the disappearance of book 
publisher Lee Bo and his colleagues.  All evidence indicates that 
Lee was abducted from Hong Kong by security agents of the 
central government, who have no legal authority to act within 
Hong Kong’s borders but appear to have done so with impunity.28  
Hong Kong residents were deeply shaken by the disappearances 
and the televised “confessions” of the booksellers while in the 
custody of mainland Chinese security forces.29  The message is 
clear: a Hong Kong resident who publishes material that 
embarrasses the Chinese Communist Party is no longer safe from 
arrest.30 
Part VIII concludes by considering the possible responses to 
these dramatic developments.  On one hand, interviews indicate 
that at least some academics plan to curtail certain projects during 
this sensitive time.31  Hong Kong book shops have also stopped 
selling certain books that are banned in the mainland, clear 
evidence of intimidation.32  On the other hand, a more assertive 
“localist” movement has also developed in Hong Kong, one that 
openly blames mainland China for a host of social and political 
problems.33  While peaceful advocacy is still the norm, a small 
minority of local residents have begun to express their frustrations 
more aggressively, as demonstrated in the “Fishball Riots” of 
 
 28 03 [Ching Cheong], $%! [Lee Bo Incident 
Exposes CCP’s Habit of Illegal Handling of Cases], INITIUM (Jan. 6, 2016), 
https://theinitium.com/article/20160106-opinion-chingcheong-cwbbookstore/ 
[https://perma.cc/HQ92-DM9C]. 
 29 Hong Kong Bookseller Defies China by Leading Protest, AL-JAZEERA (June 18, 
2016), http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/06/hong-kong-bookseller-defies-china-
leading-protest-160618145552341.html [https://perma.cc/WPD2-QFQ4]. 
 30 Michael Forsythe & Andrew Jacobs, In China, Books That Make Money, and 
Enemies, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 4, 2016), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/07/business/international/in-china-books-that-make-
money-and-enemies.html [https://perma.cc/NP89-L9Y8]. 
 31 See infra Part VIII. 
 32 Christy Leung and Oliver Chou, Hong Kong Book Stores Pull Titles Banned in 
Mainland China from Shelves as Mystery Over Missing Bookseller Deepens, S. CHINA 
MORNING POST (H.K.) (Jan. 6, 2016), http://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/education-
community/article/1898232/least-one-hong-kong-store-pulls-books-banned 
[https://perma.cc/C3EP-DFHM]. 
 33 Owen Fung, Face of the Pro-Independence Hong Kong National Party: Students 
and 20-Somethings who Shun Outside Donors, S. CHINA MORNING POST (Mar. 31, 2016), 
http://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/politics/article/1932336/face-pro-independence-
hong-kong-national-party-students-and [https://perma.cc/78P9-4V9Z]. 
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February 2016.34  Unfortunately, such actions are likely to generate 
even more oppression from Beijing.  We therefore conclude the 
article by recommending concrete changes to governance in Hong 
Kong’s universities which are urgently necessary to strengthen 
educational autonomy and rebuild academic freedom.  We also 
explore what the international community and foreign academic 
institutions can do to assist Hong Kong during these difficult 
times. 
II. The “One Country, Two Systems” Model: Formal 
Autonomy but with an Executive-Led System 
“The autonomies which have been given to Hong Kong under 
the Basic Law are unique in the world. Our autonomies surpass 
those which are available to provinces and states under many 
federal systems.”35  In 2002, this is how Hong Kong’s Secretary 
for Constitutional Affairs described the “one country, two 
systems” model.36  On one level, Secretary Lam was correct: Hong 
Kong exercises many powers that are not typically held by a state 
in a federation. For example, it issues its own travel documents, 
including a Hong Kong identity card and a Hong Kong passport, 
and applies its own immigration controls.37 The SAR also issues 
 
 34 See, e.g., Ned Levin, Hong Kong’s Failed Democracy Protests Fed Riots Over 
Street Vendors, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 10, 2016), http://www.wsj.com/articles/how-hong-
kongs-democracy-protests-fed-riots-over-street-vendors-1455108266 
[https://perma.cc/Q282-RWG5] (explaining that the riot started as an angry response to 
local police officers’ efforts to shut down popular food stalls during Chinese New Year; 
however, it was openly supported by “localists,” a group of frustrated Hong Kong 
citizens who are advocating, for the first time since 1997, aggressive protests against 
China’s interference); Hong Kong’s Mongkok Clashes: More Than Fishballs, BRIT. 
BROADCAST. CORP. (Feb. 9, 2016), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-
35529785 [https://perma.cc/LCF5-3ERD]. 
 35 See Stephen Lam, H.K. Sec’y for Constitutional Affairs, at the Seminar on Legal 
Landscape of China After Accession to WTO (Sept. 7, 2002), 
http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/200209/07/0907233.htm [https://perma.cc/Z837-
FQRG] (last visited Dec. 19, 2015). 
 36 For the historical background of the “One Country, Two Systems” concept 
(which was originally designed by China to facilitate reunification with Taiwan), see 
Ming K. Chan, The Politics of Hong Kong’s Imperfect Transition: Dimensions of the 
China Factor, in THE CHALLENGE OF HONG KONG’S REINTEGRATION WITH CHINA (Ming 
K. Chan ed., H.K. Univ. Press 1997); YASH GHAI, HONG KONG’S NEW CONSTITUTIONAL 
ORDER: THE RESUMPTION OF CHINESE SOVEREIGNTY AND THE BASIC LAW 1, 35–80 (H.K. 
Univ. Press, 2nd ed. 1999) [hereinafter GHAI]. 
 37 Basic Law, supra note 1, art. 154. 
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its own currency (the Hong Kong dollar), formulates its own 
monetary policy, and has an entirely separate taxation system.38  
Although vague on many important issues, the Basic Law is 
crystal clear when it comes to Hong Kong’s financial 
independence, stating that local tax revenues “shall not be handed 
over to the Central People’s Government” and that Beijing “shall 
not levy taxes” in the SAR.39  Hong Kong is also empowered to 
“conclude and implement agreements with foreign states and 
regions and relevant international organizations” in a variety of 
fields, including economics, trade, finance, monetary, shipping, 
and communications.40 
In addition to these specific powers, Hong Kong is vested with 
general executive powers41 and general legislative powers.42  The 
only significant limitations are in the areas of defense and foreign 
affairs43 and in certain other areas where the Basic Law expressly 
allocates an executive or legislative power to the central 
government (such as the power to appoint the Chief Executive and 
the power to amend the Basic Law).44  Hong Kong’s Legislative 
 
 38 Id. arts. 110–11.  It should be noted, however, that the Basic Law places certain 
restrictions on the nature of Hong Kong’s monetary policy.  For example, the “issue of 
Hong Kong currency must be backed by a 100 percent reserve fund,” (art. 111) and the 
local government shall “safeguard the free flow of capital within, into and out” of Hong 
Kong and shall not apply foreign exchange control policies (art. 112).  These restrictions 
are not, however, generally viewed as examples of intervention by Beijing but rather as 
reflecting the commitment to maintain Hong Kong’s free market and capitalist system. 
 39 Id. arts. 106–7 (explaining that the Basic Law obligates the local government to 
pursue fiscally conservative policies; for example, it “shall follow the principle of 
keeping expenditure within the limits of revenues” and “avoid deficits”); see also id. art. 
108 (explaining also that when enacting tax legislation it shall take “the low tax policy 
previously pursued in Hong Kong as reference”). 
 40 Id. art. 151. For further information on Hong Kong’s powers regarding external 
affairs, see id. arts. 150–57; GHAI, supra note 36, at 461–69. 
 41 Basic Law, supra note 1, art. 16 (stating that Hong Kong “shall be vested with 
executive power” and “shall, on its own, conduct the administrative affairs of the Region 
in accordance with the relevant provisions of this Law”).  For more detailed provisions 
on the powers of the Chief Executive, see id. arts. 43, 48–53. For provisions relating to 
the powers of the Executive Council (the closest thing to a cabinet in Hong Kong) and 
the Hong Kong government generally, see id. arts. 54–65. 
 42 Id. art. 17 (stating that Hong Kong “shall be vested with legislative power”).  For 
additional provisions relating to legislative powers and the legislative process, see id. 
arts. 8, 17–18, 66–79. 
 43 See id. arts. 13-14. 
 44 Id. arts. 45, 159. 
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Council enacts laws in virtually every other field that is relevant to 
local governance and no one stops to examine whether a newly 
proposed bill fits within some enumerated power granted to the 
local legislature.45  Local laws are reported to the Standing 
Committee of the NPC, which has the power to invalidate the law 
“if it is not in conformity with the provisions of [the Basic Law] 
regarding affairs within the responsibility of the Central 
Authorities or regarding the relationship between the Central 
Authorities and the Region.”46  This situation has, however, never 
arisen.  If it were to occur, the Standing Committee may not 
amend the law but rather must simply return and thereby invalidate 
it.47 
In contrast to the broad and general powers allocated to the 
Hong Kong SAR, the Basic Law defines, rather narrowly, the 
areas in which the central authorities shall exercise executive or 
legislative power.48  Article 8 provides that the sources of law in 
Hong Kong shall be: the Basic Law; Hong Kong’s pre-existing 
laws (including ordinances, common law and the rules of equity); 
and new ordinances enacted by the local legislature.49  National 
laws other than the Basic Law are not, therefore, a source of law 
for Hong Kong.  If the central government wishes to make a 
national law apply in Hong Kong it must go through a special 
procedure set forth in Article 18 of the Basic Law, which involves 
seeking advice from the Committee for the Basic Law (a joint 
committee with members from both Hong Kong and Mainland 
China) and then adding the national law to Annex III of the Basic 
 
 45 Basic Law, supra note 1, arts. 17, 73. 
 46 Id. art. 17, ¶ 3. 
 47 Id. 
 48 Id. art. 18. 
 49 Id. art. 8.  See also Quanguo Renmin Daibiao Dahui Changwu Weiyuanhui 
Guanyu Genju Zhonghua Renmin Gengheguo Xianggang Tebie Xingzhengqu Jibenfa di 
Yibai Liushi Tiao Chuli Xianggang Yuan You Falu de Jueding ( ,
-) 	.#$
+"(&*%.
#"'!) [Decision of the Standing Committee of the National People’s 
Congress on the Treatment of the Laws Previously in Force in Hong Kong in 
Accordance with Article 160 of the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative 
Region of the People’s Republic of China] Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong. (Feb. 
23, 1997) [hereinafter 1997 Decision] (showing that laws already in force in the British 
territory of Hong Kong on June 30, 1997 were adopted as part of the law of the Hong 
Kong SAR, provided that they had not been determined by the Standing Committee of 
the National People’s Congress to be in conflict with the Basic Law). 
2016 ACADEMIC FREEDOM AND CRITICAL SPEECH IN HONG KONG 11 
Law.50  Moreover, Annex III must be confined to laws relating to 
defence, foreign affairs, and other matters “outside the autonomy” 
of the Region.51  Although that final phrase is vague and could be 
abused, in practice very few national laws have been added to 
Annex III.52 
It should be noted that Article 18 also gives the central 
government the power to apply other national laws to Hong Kong 
in times of war or turmoil which “endangers national unity or 
security and is beyond the control of the government” of the 
SAR.53  Until recently, Hong Kong has enjoyed a reputation for 
being a very stable and peaceful community and thus there seemed 
to be little chance of Beijing intervening on this ground. However, 
as discussed in Part VIII of this article, if civil unrest due to 
delayed democracy becomes violent or beyond the local 
government’s control, there is a possibility that Beijing would use 
Article 18 as an excuse to apply more restrictive national laws in 
Hong Kong. 
Despite the narrow scope of the central government’s formal 
legislative powers, it is widely acknowledged that Beijing can 
influence law and policies in Hong Kong through its power to 
appoint the Chief Executive.54  Most local legislation is drafted and 
proposed by the executive branch.  Hong Kong legislators can 
 
 50 See Basic Law, supra note 1, art. 18 (declaring that national laws “shall not be 
applied” in Hong Kong except for those contained in Annex III to the Basic Law and 
setting forth the procedure for adding a national law to Annex III). 
 51 Id. 
 52 Basic Law, supra note 1, Annex III.  The Hong Kong government publishes a list 
of national laws on Annex III.  See Basic Law Full Text, THE BASIC LAW 
http://www.basiclaw.gov.hk/en/basiclawtext/annex_3.html [https://perma.cc/Y4FW-
Y4F8].  See also HKSAR v. Ng Kung Siu, [1999] 2 H.K.C.F.A.R. 442.  Annex III 
includes the Nationality Law of the PRC, the Declaration of the Government of the PRC 
on the Territorial Sea, the Regulations of the PRC Concerning Diplomatic Privileges and 
Immunities, plus three laws relating to the national calendar and the national flag, 
anthem and emblem.  The application of the law on the national flag, which prohibits 
flag desecration, was challenged but ultimately upheld.  Id. ¶ 39 (showing however, in 
the same case, Hong Kong’s Court of Final Appeal took the opportunity to confirm that 
the ICCPR is incorporated into the Basic Law).   For discussion of the significance of 
this holding, see Petersen, Embracing Universal Standards? The Role of International 
Human Rights Treaties in Hong Kong’s Constitutional Jurisprudence, in INTERPRETING 
HONG KONG’S BASIC LAW, supra note 13, at 35-36. 
 53 Basic Law, supra note 1, art. 18. 
 54 Id. art. 45 (providing that the Chief Executive is to be “selected” by local 
elections or consultations and then appointed by the Central People’s Government). 
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block government bills (and they often do so); but they cannot 
introduce new laws of any significance without the Chief 
Executive’s consent.55  Moreover, only thirty-five of the seventy 
legislators are currently elected from geographic constituencies.56  
Of the remaining thirty-five, thirty are selected from professional 
and industry-based “functional constituencies,” which are 
designed to ensure a significant number of pro-government 
legislators;57 the remaining five legislators are chosen by voters not 
registered to any of the functional constituencies that existed 
before 2012.58 
Thus, the high degree of autonomy promised in the Basic Law 
is chiefly exercised by the Chief Executive, who is primarily 
accountable to the Chinese government.59  As the relationship 
between the central authorities and the Chief Executive is largely 
hidden from public scrutiny,60 it is impossible to assess the extent 
to which Beijing uses this channel.  However, most commentators 
would probably agree that the hand of Beijing is increasingly 
evident.  This is not surprising—the delay in introducing elections 
has steadily decreased public support for the appointed Chief 
Executive, making whoever is appointed to that office increasingly 
reliant upon Beijing. 
 
 55 Id. art. 74 (prohibiting an individual legislator from introducing any bill that 
relates to public expenditure or political structure or the operation of government.  It also 
requires an individual legislator to obtain the Chief Executive’s consent before 
introducing any bill that relates to government policies). 
 56 See Legislative Council of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the 
People’s Republic of China, History of the Legislature: Overview and Composition – the 
Legislative Council Today, http://www.legco.gov.hk/general/english/intro/hist_lc-
overview-and-composition.htm. 
 57 See Michael E. DeGolyer, The Challenges of Researching Functional 
Constituencies, in HONG KONG’S CONSTITUTIONAL DEBATES ch. 9 (Johannes Chan & 
Lison Harris eds., H.K.L.J. Ltd. 2005); SIMON YOUNG & ANTHONY O.K. LAW, A 
CRITICAL INTRODUCTION TO HONG KONG’S FUNCTIONAL CONSTITUENCIES (Civic 
Exchange Ltd. July, 2004) (explaining that while some functional constituencies, such as 
the legal functional constituency, allow individuals to vote, others use corporate voting). 
 58 The system of functional constituencies is particularly significant because Annex 
I to the Basic Law requires that a bill or amendment proposed by an individual legislator 
must receive a majority of votes from both categories of legislators. 
 59 Basic Law, supra note 1, Annex I, ¶7, Annex II, ¶ 3. 
 60 See id. 
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III. Legal Protections for Academic Freedom and Critical 
Speech in Hong Kong’s Constitutional Framework 
The Hong Kong courts have the power to interpret the laws of 
Hong Kong and to judicially review local executive acts and 
legislation.  The local judiciary also interprets the Basic Law in the 
context of litigation, and there is no appeal beyond Hong Kong’s 
Court of Final Appeal.61  On the other hand, the National People’s 
Congress Standing Committee (“NPCSC”) can also issue 
“legislative interpretations” of the Basic Law, which the Hong 
Kong judiciary is required to follow.62  Moreover, Hong Kong’s 
Court of Final Appeal is required to seek an interpretation from the 
NPCSC when it determines that there is a need to interpret 
provisions of the Basic Law relating to the central government’s 
powers or the relationship between the two governments.63 As of 
October 2016, the NPCSC had exercised its power to interpret the 
Basic Law only four times and only once at the request of Hong 
Kong’s Court of Final Appeal.64 
Prior to 1991, the local judiciary’s power of judicial review 
had little impact in Hong Kong because there was no domestic bill 
of rights and the colonial constitution (the Letters Patent and 
Royal Instructions) contained very few limitations on the colonial 
government or legislature.65  This changed as a direct result of the 
June 4, 1989 massacre in Beijing’s Tiananmen Square.  With more 
than one million Hong Kong residents (approximately 20% of the 
population at the time) protesting against the Chinese government, 
 
 61 Id. art. 82 (stating that the power of final adjudication is vested in the Hong Kong 
Court of Final Appeal). 
 62 Id. art. 158; see Yash Ghai, The Political Economy of Interpretation, in 
INTERPRETING HONG KONG’S BASIC LAW, supra note 13, at 127–138 (showing the history of 
Article 158 and the damage that Beijing’s power of interpretation has done to the 
framework of the Basic Law and “one country two systems”). 
 63 Basic Law, supra note 1, art. 158. 
 64 The Hong Kong government publishes English translations of the NPCSC’s 
interpretations of the Basic Law and related “decisions,” describing them as 
“instruments” and treating them as equivalent to the text of the Basic Law: 
http://www.basiclaw.gov.hk/en/basiclawtext/index.html [https://perma.cc/F4LV-SY2R]. 
The four interpretations of the Basic Law are listed as Instruments 17, 18, 20, and 22. 
Only the interpretation referred to as “Instrument 22” was made at the behest of the 
Court of Final Appeal. 
 65 See GHAI, supra note 36, at 14–19, 25-26. 
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Hong Kong’s colonial government had an urgent need to rebuild 
public confidence.66  It thus proposed that the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (the “ICCPR”) be largely 
incorporated into Hong Kong’s domestic law, through the 
enactment of the Bill of Rights Ordinance and a simultaneous 
amendment to the colonial constitution.67  Although the Chinese 
government threatened to repeal the Bill of Rights in 1997 (using 
its powers under Article 160 of the Basic Law), in the end it only 
removed a few preliminary provisions which had no impact in 
practice.68  The incorporation of the ICCPR into Hong Kong’s 
domestic legal system thus continued, after the handover, through 
both the Bill of Rights Ordinance and Article 39 of the Basic 
Law.69  Indeed, the Hong Kong judiciary has regularly enforced 
the ICCPR in litigation challenging local laws and government 
policies and the ICCPR has thus become a sort of “gold standard” 
in Hong Kong’s constitutional framework.70 
The Joint Declaration and the Basic Law also contain many 
additional provisions protecting civil liberties, academic freedom, 
and educational autonomy.  For example, Article 27 of the Basic 
Law provides, inter alia, that Hong Kong residents shall have 
freedom of speech, of the press, and of publication.71  Article 34 
protects the freedom to engage in academic research, literary and 
artistic creation, and other cultural activities.72  The Basic Law also 
contains two provisions that expressly address educational 
autonomy and academic freedom.  Article 137 states that 
“[e]ducational institutions of all kinds may retain their autonomy 
 
 66 NORMAN MINERS, THE GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS OF HONG KONG 27 (5th ed. 
1991). 
 67 Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, (1991) Cap. 383 (H.K.) (showing that the 
Bill of Rights was largely copied from the ICCPR as applied to Hong Kong). 
 68 See 1997 Decision, supra note 49.  For analysis of why this did not affect the 
application of the Bill of Rights, see Peter Wesley-Smith, Maintenance of the Bill of 
Rights, 27 H.K.L.J. 15 (1997). 
 69 Basic Law, supra note 1, art. 39. 
 70 Petersen, Embracing Universal Standards? The Role of International Human Rights 
Treaties in Hong Kong’s Constitutional Jurisprudence, in INTERPRETING HONG KONG’S 
BASIC LAW, supra note 13 (analysing the Hong Kong courts’ approach to the ICCPR and 
other international human rights treaties that apply to Hong Kong).  See also cases discussed 
in Albert H.Y. Chen, The Rule of Law Under “One Country Two Systems: The Case of Hong 
Kong 1997-2010, 6 NAT’L TAIWAN U.L. REV. 269, 285–291 (2011). 
 71 Basic Law, supra note 1, art. 27. 
 72 Id. art. 34. 
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and enjoy academic freedom.”73  It also expressly authorizes 
educational institutions to recruit international staff and to use 
foreign teaching materials.74  It further provides that schools run by 
religious organizations may “continue to provide religious 
education, including courses on religion” and that students “enjoy 
freedom of choice of educational institutions and freedom to 
pursue their education” outside of Hong Kong.75  Similarly, Article 
136 provides that Hong Kong shall, “on its own, formulate 
policies on the development and improvement of education, 
including policies regarding the educational system and its 
administration, the language of instruction, the allocation of funds, 
the examination system, the system of academic awards, and the 
recognition of educational qualifications.”76  Taken together, these 
provisions provide Hong Kong with an exceptionally high and 
detailed level of legal protection for critical speech, academic 
freedom, and educational autonomy. 
Given Hong Kong’s constitutional framework and the 
willingness of Hong Kong’s judiciary to enforce civil liberties, it is 
unlikely that the local government would ever propose a law or 
adopt a policy that overtly restricts freedom of expression or 
academic freedom.  The closest that Hong Kong has come to 
enacting restrictive legislation was the failed attempt to enact 
national security legislation in 2002–2003.77  Article 23 has always 
been one of the most controversial and sensitive provisions in the 
Basic Law.  It states: 
The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall enact laws 
on its own to prohibit any act of treason, secession, sedition, 
subversion against the Central People’s Government, or theft of 
state secrets, to prohibit foreign political organizations or bodies 
from conducting political activities in the Region, and to prohibit 
political organizations or bodies of the Region from establishing 
 
 73 Id. art. 137. 
 74 See id. 
 75 Id. 
 76 Id. art. 136. 
 77 For further discussion, see generally Petersen, Hong Kong’s Spring of 
Discontent: The Rise and Fall of the National Security Bill in 2003, in NATIONAL 
SECURITY AND FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS, supra note 20.  Other chapters in the same 
volume analyse the specific legislative proposals, relating to treason, sedition, 
subversion, secession, protection of state secrets, and proscription of organisations. 
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ties with foreign political organizations or bodies.78 
The reason that Article 23 still has not been implemented in 
Hong Kong through local legislation is that the historic anti-
government demonstration of July 1, 2003 forced Tung Chee-hwa 
(the Hong Kong SAR’s first Chief Executive, who was appointed 
by the central government) to withdraw the National Security 
(Legislative Provisions) Bill 2003.79  The saga is a classic example 
of how an unelected government can become too dismissive of 
public opinion.  The government’s initial proposals, which were 
distributed in 2002, were not entirely unreasonable.80  In fact, some 
of the proposals would have liberalized draconian laws that had 
been left over from the colonial period and are probably now 
unenforceable, as they conflict with the ICCPR.81  Unfortunately, 
the government also included proposals that went beyond the strict 
requirements of Article 23 and created apprehension among Hong 
Kong academics and the general population.  For example, the bill 
proposed to add new categories of “protected information” and 
also to broaden the scope of offenses relating to “unauthorized and 
damaging disclosure” of protected information.82  The bill also 
included a proposal that could have allowed the central 
government to play a role in the proscription of local organizations 
(those with links to organizations proscribed in Mainland China) 
on grounds of “national security.”83  The public’s concerns were 
exacerbated when Hong Kong government officials revealed that 
 
 78 Basic Law, supra note 1, art. 23. 
 79 See Legislative Council of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the 
People’s Republic of China, Bills Committee on the National Security (Legislative 
Provisions) Bill, http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr02-03/english/bc/bc55/general/bc55.htm 
(publishing the bill as introduced in 2003 and the Legislative Council Brief and noting 
that the bill lapsed without being enacted). 
 80 See PROPOSALS TO IMPLEMENT ARTICLE 23 OF THE BASIC LAW: A CONSULTATION 
DOCUMENT (H.K. Gov’t, Sept. 2002). 
 81 See Fu Hualing, Past and Future Offences of Sedition in Hong Kong, in 
NATIONAL SECURITY AND FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS, supra note 20 (explaining that, for 
example, the government’s proposals regarding sedition would have liberalised Hong 
Kong’s law of sedition, which is no longer enforceable due to conflicts with the ICCPR). 
 82 See Johannes Chan, National Security and the Unauthorized and Damaging 
Disclosure of Protected Information, in NATIONAL SECURITY AND FUNDAMENTAL 
FREEDOMS, supra note 20. 
 83 See generally Lison Harris, Lilly Ma, and C.B. Fung, A Connecting Door: The 
Proscription of Local Organizations, in NATIONAL SECURITY AND FUNDAMENTAL 
FREEDOMS, supra note 20. 
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they had consulted with central government authorities on the 
content of the proposed legislation.84 
Hong Kong academics played a significant role in critiquing—
and ultimately defeating—the proposals to implement Article 23.85  
A survey of 442 teachers conducted during the initial consultation 
period revealed that 75% opposed the government’s proposals, 
citing concerns for academic freedom and their ability to conduct 
research.86 
Academics also organized numerous forums on the proposals, 
submitted comments to the government and the Legislative 
Council, launched signature campaigns, and gave interviews to the 
press to raise public awareness.87  The University of Hong Kong 
Faculty of Law was particularly active: Professor Johannes Chan 
was one of the founding members of the “Article 23 Concern 
Group,”88 while the Faculty’s Centre for Comparative and Public 
Law (“CCPL”) adopted Article 23 as a major research project and 
organized an international conference to critique the legislative 
proposals.89  University students were also active opponents of 
Article 23, sometimes openly jeering the Secretary for Security 
when she tried to defend the proposals during campus forums.90 
Perhaps most important, at the end of the official period of public 
consultation, a group of academics who specialized in the fields of 
 
 84 See Petersen, Hong Kong’s Spring of Discontent: The Rise and Fall of the 
National Security Bill in 2003, in NATIONAL SECURITY AND FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS, 
supra note 20, at 22–23. 
 85 S.H. May, Academics Plan United Front on Article 23, S. CHINA MORNING POST 
(H.K.), Oct. 30, 2002, at 2. 
 86 Linda Young, New Security Law Seen as Threat to Teaching, Research; Broad-
based Academic Opposition Endorses Signature Campaign Against Grey Areas of 
Provisions in Article 23, S. CHINA MORNING POST (H.K.), Nov. 16, 2002, at 3. 
 87 For details, see ACADEMIC FREEDOM, supra note 3, at 96–99. 
 88 The Article 23 Concern Group was mainly composed of lawyers but included 
professors of law.  It produced pamphlets, in both Chinese and English, that explained 
the legislation in a way that non-lawyers could understand, which helped to raise public 
awareness of the dangers to civil liberties posed by the legislation. 
 89 See Centre for Comparative and Public Law, Research: Article 23 of the Basic Law, 
http://www.law.hku.hk/ccpl/research/projects/article23.html [https://perma.cc/W3RJ-
ARML] (detailing the 2002 conference and other submissions to the government on the 
Article 23 proposals). 
 90 Ambrose Leung & Ng Kang-chung, Regina Ip Slugs it Out with Rowdy Forum, 
S. CHINA MORNING POST (Oct. 16, 2002), http://www.scmp.com/article/394549/regina-
ip-slugs-it-out-critics-rowdy-forum [https://perma.cc/LT36-BDYE]. 
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statistics and public opinion sampling formed a Research Team to 
assess the large number of public submissions on the 
government’s proposals.91  The Research Team published a 
lengthy report disclosing its methodology and demonstrating how 
the government had understated the level of opposition to the 
proposed legislation.92 
Despite the rising public outcry, the Hong Kong government 
adopted an inflexible attitude, rejecting suggestions that it publish 
a “White Paper” (a draft of the bill) before formally introducing 
the legislation in the Legislative Council.93  It also demanded an 
accelerated schedule for scrutinizing the bill and made it clear that 
it wanted the bill passed by the summer of 2003.94  Although 
legislators in opposition parties drafted many amendments, the 
government declined to negotiate with them, apparently because 
government officials assumed that they could rely upon 
representatives of the functional constituencies and other pro-
government legislators to defeat any proposed amendments in the 
Legislative Council.95 
The government’s strategy was particularly unwise because 
Hong Kong was simultaneously suffering from Severe Acute 
Respiratory Syndrome (“SARS”) in 2003, which was taking a 
heavy toll on the local economy and public confidence.96 An 
elected government probably would have adopted a more 
conciliatory attitude, agreed to slow down the legislative process, 
and accepted some additional amendments proposed by the elected 
legislators.  Instead, the government announced its own, very 
 
 91 See Research Team on the Compendium of Submissions on Article 23 of the 
Basic Law, Doing Justice to Public Opinion in Public Consultations: What to Do and 
What NOT to Do: A Case Study of the Government’s Consultation Exercise on Its 
Proposals to Implement Article 23 of the Basic Law (2002), 
https://www.hkupop.hku.hk/english/resources/bl23/bl23gp/report/ 
[https://perma.cc/JC6H-CXDT]. 
 92 Id. 
 93 Petersen, Hong Kong’s Spring of Discontent: The Rise and Fall of the National 
Security Bill in 2003, in NATIONAL SECURITY AND FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS, supra note 
20, at 31. 
 94 Id. at 33. 
 95 Id. at 28–37 (detailing the government’s mistakes during the consultation 
process). 
 96 Lee Shiu Hung, The SARS Epidemic in Hong Kong: What Lessons Have We 
Learned?, J. ROYAL SOC’Y MEDICINE (Aug. 2003). 
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limited amendments and pressed for a quick vote on the Bill.97  
This created a crisis atmosphere and ultimately caused more than 
500,000 people to join an anti-Article 23 protest march on July 1, 
2003, the sixth anniversary of Hong Kong’s return to China.98  The 
government and its supporters were shocked by the size of the 
march.99  The Liberal Party, a pro-business party that controlled 
eight functional constituency seats and normally supported the 
government, responded by asking the government to delay 
consideration of the Bill.100  When the government refused, the 
leader of the Liberal Party resigned from Tung Chee-hwa’s 
Executive Council and withdrew his party’s support.101  The Hong 
Kong government eventually had to withdraw the Bill altogether 
and two ministers resigned as a result of the crisis.102   Tung 
himself resigned in early 2005, more than two years before the end 
of his second term as Chief Executive—officially for health 
reasons, but in reality, because he had lost credibility with both 
Beijing and the Hong Kong public.103 
On one level, the Hong Kong government’s inability to 
implement Article 23 of the Basic Law was a victory for civil 
liberties and academic freedom.  On the other hand, the saga 
prompted Beijing to reexamine its entire Hong Kong policy.104  
Since 2003, the central government has become even more 
reluctant to permit democratic reforms and increasingly 
interventionist in matters that are formally within the city’s 
autonomy under the Basic Law.105  As demonstrated in later 
 
 97 Petersen, Hong Kong’s Spring of Discontent: The Rise and Fall of the National 
Security Bill in 2003, in NATIONAL SECURITY AND FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS, supra note 
20, at 46–49. 
 98 Huge Protest Fills HK Streets, CNN (July 2, 2003), 
http://edition.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/asiapcf/east/07/01/hk.protest/ 
[https://perma.cc/PR9Z-VDVD] [hereinafter HK Protest 2003]. 
 99 Id. 
 100 Petersen, Hong Kong’s Spring of Discontent: The Rise and Fall of the National 
Security Bill in 2003, in NATIONAL SECURITY AND FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS, supra note 
20, at 50. 
 101 Id. at 50. 
 102 Id. at 52. 
 103 ACADEMIC FREEDOM, supra note 3, at 104. 
 104 Petersen, Hong Kong’s Spring of Discontent: The Rise and Fall of the National 
Security Bill in 2003, in NATIONAL SECURITY AND FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS, supra note 
20, at 57. 
 105 See infra Part VI. 
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sections of this article, Beijing and pro-Beijing forces in Hong 
Kong have also become increasingly hostile towards academics 
who regularly engage in research and advocacy projects that are 
critical of government proposals or the lack of democratic reform 
in Hong Kong.106 
IV. University Governance: The Impact of Increased 
Centralization and Control 
Each of Hong Kong’s publicly funded institutions of higher 
education is established by a local ordinance, beginning with the 
University of Hong Kong in 1911.107  The territory followed the 
traditional British model and bestowed the title of “Chancellor” 
upon the Governor of Hong Kong.  In the colonial period, that 
position was largely ceremonial and the Vice Chancellor (or 
President in some institutions) would be recognized as the highest 
ranking official and the person with true authority in the 
institution.108  The Chancellor did hold the power to appoint the 
University Council (which includes external as well as internal 
members).109  However, in the colonial era, this meant that a 
university submitted a list of suggested members who would then 
be formally appointed by the Governor, as Chancellor.110  This is 
not to suggest that the colonial government paid no attention to 
university politics,111 but the colonial government generally 
 
 106 See infra Parts VI-VIII. 
 107 See, e.g., University of Hong Kong Ordinance, (1911) Cap. 1053, (H.K.) (setting 
goals for the establishment of a university). 
 108 Alex Lo, Chief Executive as Chancellor of Hong Kong’s Universities is an 
Anachronism, S. CHINA MORNING POST (H.K.) (July 13, 2015), 
http://www.scmp.com/comment/insight-opinion/article/1838191/chief-executive-
chancellor-hong-kong-universities [https://perma.cc/QBT4-KZRJ]. 
 109 Id. 
 110 Cannix Yau, Politics has Always Played a Role in University of Hong Kong’s 
Complex 104-Year History, S. CHINA MORNING POST (H.K.) (Sept. 12, 2015), 
http://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/education-community/article/1857420/politics-
has-always-played-role-university-hong [https://perma.cc/3H49-E7KU] (quoting 
Professor Peter Cunich, an historian who has published a history of the University of 
Hong Kong). 
 111 Id. (noting that the colonial government did monitor the University of Hong 
Kong for signs of student radicalization and that at least one lecturer was compelled to 
take early retirement due to his pro-communist views, which Professor Cunich described 
as a “blotch” on the record of the University of Hong Kong). 
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exercised a “laissez-faire” approach.112  Over time, the number of 
degree-granting institutions increased and the University Grants 
Committee was established to make recommendations on funding 
and to serve as a “buffer” between the government and publicly 
funded institutions of higher education.113 
In 1997, the Governor was replaced by the first Chief 
Executive, Tung Chee-hwa, who inherited the title of “Chancellor” 
for all eight publicly funded degree-granting institutions.114  In 
hindsight, this automatic continuation of the tradition was a 
mistake, as there is evidence that the position is being used far 
more than during the colonial period to influence the public 
universities.115  For example, rather than allowing each university 
to suggest a list of council members, the Chief Executive now 
appoints anyone he wants to university councils, with little regard 
for the institution’s preferences or need for expertise.116  Moreover, 
Hong Kong’s Chief Executives are now more likely than colonial 
Governors to use their influence to overtly interfere in university 
business.117 
In order to illustrate the effect of these changes, this section of 
the article will first briefly review the “Robert Chung” incident in 
1999-2000, as it is still the most famous post-1997 attempt by the 
Hong Kong government to directly restrict an academic’s 
 
 112 Id. (quoting Professor Peter Cunich and Elizabeth Wong, who served as 
Secretary for Health during the colonial period). 
 113 See Carlson Tong, Chairman, University Grants Committee, Message from the 
Chairman of the UGC, http://ugc.hk/eng/ugc/about/message/chairman.htm 
[https://perma.cc/64CH-DBTY] (last visited Mar. 15, 2016). 
 114 The eight institutions are: the University of Hong Kong; Chinese University of 
Hong Kong; Hong Kong University of Science and Technology; Hong Kong Polytechnic 
University; City University of Hong Kong; Hong Kong Baptist University; Lingnan 
University; and the Education University of Hong Kong, previously known as the Hong 
Kong Institute of Education. 
 115 See Yau, supra note 110. 
 116 University Grants Committee, Governance in UCG-funded Higher Education 
Institutions in Hong Kong, (submitted to the UGC by Sir Edward Newby in September 
2015 and published by the UGC on Mar. 30, 2016), at 20, 
http://www.ugc.edu.hk/eng/ugc/publication/report/her/her.htm [https://perma.cc/JS5J-
ZJ3A] (last visited Apr. 10, 2016) [hereinafter Newby Report]; see Yau, supra note 110 
(noting the similar observations by Professor Cunich when interviewed by the S. China 
Morning Post). 
 117 See id. 
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research.118  In 1999, Robert Chung Ting-yiu was a PhD candidate 
at the University of Hong Kong (“HKU”).119  He developed an 
opinion poll research project that tracked the declining popularity 
of Tung Chee-hwa.120  In July 2000 (after he had completed his 
PhD and secured a position at HKU), Chung published a short 
article alleging that he had been pressured to discontinue the 
project in the previous year.121  He claimed that “more than once, I 
was given a clear message from Mr. Tung via a special channel 
that my polling activities were not welcomed.  Mr. Tung did not 
like me polling his popularity or the Government’s credibility.  I 
was told that he did not like to see universities involved in such 
activities and that our polls should stop.”122 
The article generated a good deal of controversy and the 
government initially responded by demanding that Chung identify 
the “special channel” who had allegedly pressured him.123  Chung 
eventually revealed that the Vice-Chancellor (HKU’s highest-
ranking officer) had sent him the message, via Professor Wong Siu 
Lun (a Pro-Vice-Chancellor and Robert Chung’s PhD 
supervisor).124  The Vice-Chancellor responded swiftly to the 
allegation: although he admitted that Andrew Lo, a “Senior 
Special Assistant” to Tung Chee-hwa, had visited him at HKU to 
discuss Robert Chung’s research project, the Vice Chancellor 
insisted that he had never asked anyone at HKU to put pressure on 
Robert Chung.125  As this created a dispute of fact, HKU’s Council 
had little choice but to appoint an Independent Investigation Panel, 
consisting of a former judge of the High Court, a senior barrister, 
 
 118 For a summary of the Robert Chung affair, see Petersen, Lessons, supra note 21. 
 119 Id. 
 120 Id. 
 121 Id. 
 122 Robert Chung, Pressure to Stop Opinion Polls not Welcome, S. CHINA MORNING 
POST (H.K.), July 7, 2000, at 1. 
 123 Exco Three Turn Up Heat on Pollster, S. CHINA MORNING POST (H.K.), July 12, 
2000, at 7. 
 124 Pollster “Irresponsible” if he Withholds Source: Renewed Calls for Clarification 
Turns Up Heat on Pollster, S. CHINA MORNING POST (H.K.), July 13, 2000, at 2. 
 125 See Mark Lander, Citing Pressure, A Pollster Says Academic Freedom is Under 
Siege in Hong Kong, N.Y. TIMES (July 16, 2000), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2000/07/16/world/citing-pressure-a-pollster-says-academic-
freedom-is-under-siege-in-hong-kong.html [https://perma.cc/99ZE-PM6N]. 
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and the Executive Officer of Hong Kong’s Consumer Council.126  
The Panel held public hearings, which were televised and widely 
reported in the press.127  Given the seriousness of the allegations, 
the Panel also decided that it would adopt the criminal standard of 
proof—beyond a reasonable doubt—when assessing the 
allegations made by Robert Chung.128 
After more than two weeks of hearings, the Panel delivered its 
Report to HKU’s Council.129  The Panel determined that Robert 
Chung’s allegations were true: Professor Wong (acting at the 
behest of the Vice-Chancellor) had conveyed a message to Robert 
Chung that was “calculated to inhibit his right to academic 
freedom.”130  The Panel concluded that this action was taken as a 
result of the meeting between the Vice-Chancellor and Andrew 
Lo, a special assistant to Tung Chee-hwa.131  The Panel also 
concluded that the Vice Chancellor and Andrew Lo had not given 
full and accurate testimony regarding their initial meeting to 
discuss Robert Chung’s research.132  Government lawyers 
representing Mr. Lo reacted strongly to this finding and initially 
requested the Council to delay releasing the Report to the public.133  
Although this request was later withdrawn (and the Council 
released the Report in September 2000), the government’s 
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displeasure was clear, which made academic staff concerned that 
HKU’s Council would try to distance itself from the Panel’s 
findings.134 
The Council Chairman, Sir T.L. Yang, was in a particularly 
difficult position because he was also a member of Tung Chee-
hwa’s Executive Council (similar to a cabinet) at the time and Mr. 
Tung had already publicly disagreed with the Panel’s findings.135  
A group of HKU academics therefore drafted a petition, which 
was circulated by email, requesting the Council to accept the 
Report.136 Within three days, 439 academics, over half of the 
academic staff of HKU, had signed this petition.137  Many 
signatories did not have tenure but probably felt somewhat 
reassured by the fact that the signatories included six of the nine 
deans, fourteen associate deans, and twenty-six heads of 
departments or centers within the university.138  At the time, all of 
the deans were elected from among their respective faculties and 
they all sat on HKU’s Council, giving the university a reasonable 
balance between internal and external members.139  Although the 
petition did not call upon HKU’s Council to take any particular 
action beyond adopting the Report, it demonstrated that the Vice-
Chancellor had lost credibility with the majority of his academic 
staff.140 
Shortly before the Council meeting resumed on September 6, 
2000, the Vice-Chancellor and Pro-Vice-Chancellor Wong both 
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offered their resignations.141   They almost certainly did so in order 
to save the external members of HKU’s Council from having to 
decide whether to take any formal action on the Panel’s Report.  
After the resignations were announced, the Chairman quickly 
introduced a series of motions to the effect that the Council would 
simply “note” the Report rather than formally adopt it.142  
Interestingly, the Council was careful to note only the Panel’s 
findings regarding the Vice-Chancellor and Professor Wong, 
thereby distancing itself from any findings relating to Tung Chee-
hwa’s assistant.143  This course of action was supported by the 
external members of the Council but objected to by the student 
members and the majority of the deans.144  There is little doubt that 
the external members were influenced by their reluctance to 
criticize a member of the Chief Executive’s staff. 
Following the Robert Chung affair, HKU established a Senate 
Task Force on Academic Freedom, which sought submissions 
from students and staff.145  The Task Force concluded that “there is 
evidence to suggest that a number of members of this university 
have felt that their academic freedoms have been infringed in a 
variety of ways.”146  It recommended that HKU adopt a definition 
of academic freedom and a list of freedoms enjoyed by members 
of the university, including the freedom to put forward 
controversial opinions, to question the governance and conduct of 
university affairs, to discuss university affairs in appropriate 
media, to select one’s areas of research, and to offer expert advice 
in both academic and non-academic contexts.147  The Task Force 
also stressed that members of the university have an obligation to 
support academic freedom and to “avoid simply using rank or 
positions as a means of imposing opinions or values.”148  To their 
credit, HKU’s Council and Senate later adopted the Task Force’s 
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definition of academic freedom, as well as the suggested list of 
freedoms and responsibilities.149 
Robert Chung continues to direct opinion poll research at HKU 
and he does not shy away from reporting on sensitive topics, 
including the low levels of support for the appointed Chief 
Executive and declining public confidence.150  Yet the saga also 
demonstrated how easily government officials can intimidate 
university councils, particularly the external members.151  In the 
wake of the scandal, one of the authors of this article 
recommended certain reforms to make the universities more 
autonomous, including: abolishing the Chief Executive’s role as 
chancellor of every university; adopting a firm rule that no 
member of a university council could simultaneously serve as a 
member of the Chief Executive’s Executive Council; and changing 
the balance of membership on university councils so that the 
external members would not hold a majority of the seats.152 
Unfortunately, the system of university governance moved in 
precisely the opposite direction after the Robert Chung affair, 
becoming more centralized and more vulnerable to outside 
interference.153  This is largely due to recommendations in a 2002 
report commissioned by the University Grants Committee and 
authored by Lord Sutherland, Vice-Chancellor of the University of 
Edinburgh, entitled Higher Education in Hong Kong: Report of 
the University Grants Committee (also known as the “Sutherland 
Report”).154  The Sutherland Report concluded that the system of 
governance used in Hong Kong’s traditional universities—
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including elected deans and the practice of distributing governance 
among several bodies, such as a Council, Senate, and Faculty 
Boards—was old-fashioned and inappropriate for building world 
class universities.155  Emphasizing that universities now manage 
substantial public funds, the report endorsed the more centralized 
systems of governance that are used at leading universities in the 
USA, the U.K., and Australia.156  The report also expressed a 
strong preference for appointed deans, which is consistent with 
international practice but not necessarily the best approach in 
Hong Kong, given the lack of local democracy and the hostility 
towards free speech from the central government.157 
Despite many academics’ concerns, the recommendations of 
the Sutherland Report were largely endorsed by a subsequent 
review at HKU, known as the Fit For Purpose Report, which 
concluded that the “globalization of higher education and an 
increasingly competitive environment” require more “robust” and 
“streamlined” systems of governance.158  As part of these 
“reforms,” HKU abolished the tradition of electing deans from 
within the faculties and it now advertises for and appoints full-
time “executive” deans.159  Although members of the faculty elect 
some representatives onto the relevant search committee, the Vice-
Chancellor makes the ultimate decision on appointment and 
reappointment of deans and has no obligation to follow the 
recommendations of faculty representatives.160  Thus the deans are 
now a part of the Vice-Chancellor’s team and almost certainly less 
accountable to their respective faculties.  The appointed deans, in 
turn, now appoint HKU’s heads of departments.161  In our view, 
had this been the case during the Robert Chung affair, it is unlikely 
that so many deans and heads of departments would have signed 
the petition that led to the Vice-Chancellor’s resignation. 
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HKU also now has a smaller Council, which is even more 
dominated by non-university members than it was during the 
Robert Chung affair.162  Similar changes have been made to Hong 
Kong’s other institutions of higher education, greatly increasing 
the influence of the Chief Executive.163  The Newby Report, 
prepared by Sir Howard Newby for the UGC in 2015, 
acknowledged that the Chief Executive’s power to appoint the 
external members of universities’ councils leaves the universities 
with “little or no control” and “places a premium on the nature of 
the relationship” with the Chief Executive’s office.164  This puts 
the universities in a particularly difficult position because there are 
so many conflicts between the government and the academic 
community, a situation unlikely to change as long as Beijing 
refuses to allow the Hong Kong people to elect their Chief 
Executive. Examples of these conflicts—which have become 
increasingly heated in the past five years—are analyzed in the next 
section of the article. 
V.  Conflicts between The Academic Community and the Hong 
Kong and Central Governments 
It is not surprising that academics at Hong Kong’s universities 
would be deeply involved in the study of “One Country, Two 
Systems” and various cross-border controversies that have arisen 
since 1997.165  For example, Baptist University’s Hong Kong 
Transition Project has been studying political developments in the 
territory since 1989, including the increasingly contentious topic 
of democracy.166  HKU academics associated with the CCPL also 
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have been prolific on issues relating to the implementation of the 
Joint Declaration, Hong Kong’s Bill of Rights, and the Basic 
Law.167 
In recent years, the most controversial subject has been 
whether and how Hong Kong will be permitted to develop a more 
democratic system of governance.  There is a good deal of material 
for academics to study and comment upon, partly because the 
current system is so complicated (perhaps deliberately so), making 
it important for researchers to study just how the system works.  
For example, Centre for Comparative and Public Law published a 
series of research reports on the functional constituency seats in 
the Legislative Council, including the problem of “packing” 
(whereby a corporation can create additional subsidiaries and 
affiliated companies to increase its votes within a constituency).168  
HKU academics also produced and commented on various 
proposals to nominate and elect a Chief Executive through 
universal suffrage.169 
For academics who study law and politics, their research 
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interests and their political activities often naturally overlap. For 
example, as a Professor of Political Science at City University, 
Joseph Cheng Yu-shek has published extensively on political 
movements in Hong Kong.170  He also served as the convener of 
the Alliance for True Democracy and has endeavored to moderate 
between different factions within Hong Kong’s pro-democracy 
movement.171  At the other end of the political spectrum, Ms. 
Priscilla Leung holds the rank of Associate Professor of Law at 
City University,172 while also serving as a legislator and political 
commentator who regularly champions pro-Beijing views.173  
Indeed, if one scans the biographies of members of the Legislative 
Council, the District Councils, and the political parties, one will 
find many academics listed there.174  As their political positions are 
generally not “full-time,” this means that many academics are 
wearing two hats—one as a politician and one as a lecturer or 
professor at a university.175  There are no rules against this in Hong 
Kong—and in fact, many members of the Legislative Council 
maintain other careers.  However, that so many university 
employees are in the thick of the debate on democratic reform in 
Hong Kong—not simply as researchers and commentators but as 
active political campaigners—naturally increases the tension 
between government officials and the academic community. 
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These conflicts have become especially acute in recent years.  
Beijing has delayed democracy reforms, making the local 
appointed government all the more unpopular and, therefore, more 
sensitive to critical research projects and advocacy.  Although the 
Basic Law expressly provides for democratic reform, it pinpoints 
the second decade after reunification as the first time that 
significant changes can be made.  Article 45 states that there shall 
be “gradual and orderly progress” in the method of selecting the 
Chief Executive, and that the “ultimate aim” is selection “by 
universal suffrage upon nomination by a broadly representative 
nominating committee in accordance with democratic 
procedures.”176  Similarly, Article 68 provides for “gradual and 
orderly progress” toward the ultimate aim of electing “all members 
of the Legislative Council by universal suffrage.”177  This would 
appear to expressly allow for the eventual abolition of the 
functional constituency seats.  Yet the Annexes to the Basic Law 
set forth procedures that must be followed in order to move in this 
direction and establish substantial hurdles.178 
For example, Annex I to the Basic Law provides that: “If there 
is a need to amend the method for selecting the Chief Executive 
for the terms subsequent to the year 2007,” such amendments must 
be endorsed by a two-thirds majority of the Legislative Council, 
approved by the Chief Executive, and reported to the NPCSC for 
approval.179  Annex II requires a similar procedure for changes to 
the method of selecting the Legislative Council, except that it 
states that the changes must be reported to the NPCSC “for the 
record” (rather than “for approval”).180  In practice, this language 
does not make a great deal of difference, because the appointed 
Chief Executive would almost certainly withhold his consent to 
any changes that the central government was not prepared to 
approve. 
Beijing has consistently exploited the procedural requirements 
in the Annexes in order to delay the pace of reform,181 using its 
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power to interpret the Basic Law (pursuant to Article 158) to 
create new barriers.182  For example, in 2004, in response to the 
July 2003 march against national security legislation and strong 
performance of pro-democracy parties in that year’s District 
Council elections, the NPCSC issued an interpretation of Annexes 
I and II that arrogated to itself the right to determine whether 
electoral reform was “necessary,” following a report from the 
Chief Executive.183  Unsurprisingly, then-Chief Executive Tung 
advised,184 and the NPCSC declared, that such reforms were not 
necessary for the Chief Executive elections in 2007 and legislative 
elections in 2008.185  In 2007, the NPCSC, again responding to 
political pressure on the Hong Kong government, declared that 
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there would be no election by universal suffrage in 2012.186 
Faced with a line of NPCSC decisions delaying 
democratization, Hong Kong’s democrats became bitterly divided 
about how to react.  In November 2009, the Hong Kong 
government released modest proposals on Chief Executive and 
legislative electoral reforms for 2012.187  In response, five 
legislators—one from each of the territory’s geographical 
constituencies—resigned in order to trigger a “de facto 
referendum” on reform.188  However, the Democratic Party of 
Hong Kong—then the largest pro-democracy party—declined to 
participate, instead entering into secret negotiations with Beijing’s 
liaison office in Hong Kong (the “Liaison Office”).189  Although 
the reform proposals were narrowly passed in 2010, they provoked 
a severe backlash against the Democratic Party, splitting the pro-
democracy camp—and intensifying public demands for 
democratization.190 
In the midst of this tension, Donald Tsang (the second Chief 
Executive, who served from 2005–2012) threw more fuel on the 
fire by emphasizing, in his 2010–11 policy address, the importance 
of national unity and of strengthening “national education” in local 
schools.191  Although the topic of national education had been 
raised in previous policy addresses, this time the government had a 
concrete plan in mind.  In 2011, the local Education Bureau issued 
a public consultation document stressing the need to develop 
“affection for the country” and “national identity.”192  In 2012, it 
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published a curriculum guide.193  In the same year, a government-
funded body, the National Education Services Centre, distributed a 
teaching handbook that described the Chinese Communist Party as 
“progressive, selfless, and united,” implying that China’s one party 
state was superior to multiparty democracies.194 
The suggested curriculum was strongly criticized by the 
public, both as a form of brainwashing, and as a violation of Hong 
Kong’s autonomy in the field of education.195  Large protests were 
organized by multiple coalitions, including the National Education 
Parents’ Concern Group, the Civil Alliance Against the National 
Education, and Scholarism—a relatively new student organization.  
The protests attracted thousands of people and gained international 
attention, launching the political career of Scholarism’s young 
leader, Joshua Wong (who would go on to be a key organizer of 
the pro-democracy protests in 2014).196 
The sheer scale of the anti-patriotic education protests created 
a sense of crisis early in the first term of the third Chief Executive, 
C.Y. Leung, who had only assumed office in July 2012.  Looking 
for a way to defuse the situation, Leung asked one of the few 
liberal members of his Executive Council, Anna Wu, to chair a 
“Committee on the Initiation of Moral and National Education.”197  
After three meetings, the Committee recommended that the 
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schools should exercise complete autonomy over whether, when, 
and how to teach the subjects of moral and national education.198  
Although the Chief Executive quickly agreed, there is a lingering 
fear in Hong Kong that this battle is not over.  Moreover, that the 
local Hong Kong government could not implement the new 
curriculum—like its failure to implement Article 23 legislation in 
2003—has made Beijing even more suspicious of grassroots 
movements in Hong Kong and more opposed to meaningful 
democratic reforms. 
Against this background of growing political acrimony, 
securing consensus on a more democratic method of selecting the 
Chief Executive in 2017 would have been difficult at best.  Yet 
neither the pro-democracy leaders nor Beijing made significant 
strides to lower the political temperature.  In a speech on March 
24, 2013, NPC Law Committee Chairman Qiao Xiaoyang declared 
that any candidate for Chief Executive must “love the country and 
love Hong Kong,” adding that no person who “confronted” the 
Central Government could become Chief Executive.199  Similar 
rhetoric about “loving the country and loving Hong Kong” had 
featured in previous debates over democratization.  However, 
Qiao’s speech contained an additional threat.  Beijing’s patience, 
he declared, had worn thin; no consultations on further reforms 
could begin unless Hong Kong’s democrats accepted that no 
“confrontational” candidate could become Chief Executive.200  
Despite widespread democratic uproar, the Hong Kong 
government took Qiao’s speech as its template for electoral 
consultations; the ensuing consultation document was widely 
panned as being a purely cosmetic exercise.201 
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In January 2013, a soft-spoken Associate Professor of Law at 
HKU named Benny Tai began writing about a new initiative, 
which he dubbed Occupy Central with Love and Peace (“Occupy 
Central”).202  Tai proposed that Hong Kong residents should not 
wait indefinitely, but rather should set a deadline and take 
meaningful action if Beijing continued to refuse to allow the 
territory to elect its Chief Executive through universal suffrage.203  
On March 27, 2013, Tai formally launched the movement, 
together with Chan Kin-man, a sociology professor from Chinese 
University, and Reverend Chu Yiu-ming.204  The movement 
appealed to many Hong Kong residents who were growing 
frustrated with China’s continued opposition to democratic 
reforms.  If the final electoral reform proposals did not conform 
with international standards of universal suffrage, Occupy Central 
declared, it would engage in concerted civil disobedience in the 
form of blockading the city’s business district.205  Although firmly 
committed to nonviolence, the Occupy Central organizers also 
made it clear that they were prepared to violate the law and go to 
jail if necessary.206 
Given that two of the three leaders of Occupy Central were 
academics, it was perhaps inevitable that Beijing would associate 
the movement with Hong Kong’s universities.207  The Occupy 
Central Secretariat also commissioned HKU’s Public Opinion 
Programme, led by Dr. Robert Chung, to conduct an Occupy 
Central “Deliberation Series,” which applied the deliberative 
democracy model to “invite the general public and campaign 
supporters to join the discussion” and ensure that any polling of 
public opinion on the various democracy proposals would comply 
with international standards.208  Although the Public Opinion 
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Program maintained its political neutrality, and therefore never 
endorsed Occupy Central or any particular model of governance, 
its very participation in activities initiated by Occupy Central 
would have displeased pro-Beijing forces.  HKU’s Centre for 
Comparative and Public Law also held many public events on 
constitutional reforms during 2013 and 2014,209 including an 
international “roundtable” on the relationship between Article 25 
of the ICCPR, which guarantees the right to political participation, 
and Article 45 of the Basic Law, which provides for a nominating 
committee to nominate candidates for Chief Executive.210  At the 
conclusion of the roundtable, the participants issued a press release 
expressing the view that a proposal could comply with both Article 
25 of the ICCPR and Article 45 of the Basic Law if the nominating 
committee were truly representative of the public.211  Implicitly, 
these academics were suggesting that compromise was possible.212  
Many other academics proposed models that would maintain a 
nominating committee, but would make it more representative.213 
However, neither Beijing nor the organizers of Occupy Central 
were in the mood for compromise and both sides continued to 
ratchet up tensions during 2014.  Increasingly bellicose rhetoric 
from Beijing culminated in the PRC State Council’s “White 
Paper” of June 10, 2014, which declared that Beijing “directly 
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exercises jurisdiction over the HKSAR” and demanded that “all 
those who administrate Hong Kong” must be “patriotic.”214  For its 
part, Occupy Central held a referendum between June 20 and June 
29, and nearly 800,000 voters participated, despite “one of the 
largest and most sophisticated denial-of-service attacks in the 
Internet’s history.”215  An overwhelming majority of participating 
voters agreed that the legislature should reject any proposal 
inconsistent with international standards.216  Nonetheless, the Hong 
Kong government’s consultation report stated that “mainstream 
opinion” backed the political vetting of Chief Executive 
candidates.217 
Although some commentators remained optimistic about the 
possibility of compromise, the NPCSC dashed all such hopes with 
its Decision of August 31, 2014, which entrenched the requirement 
that any Chief Executive “love the country and love Hong 
Kong.”218  In practical terms, it required: (a) between two and three 
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candidates for Chief Executive, (b) candidates to be chosen by a 
1,200-strong Nominating Committee structured in the same way as 
the extant Election Committee, (c) each candidate to receive 
support from at least half of the nominators—a dramatic increase 
from the one-eighth threshold required for nomination in 2012, 
and (d) all candidates to “love the country and love Hong 
Kong.”219  The upshot of the 2014 Decision was that only 
politicians deemed politically palatable to Beijing could run—an 
outcome Lawrence Lessig described as “Tweedism updated.”220 
In the wake of the 2014 Decision, Occupy Central organizer 
Benny Tai declared, “[t]he road of dialogue has come to the 
end.”221  The Hong Kong Federation of Students (“HKFS”), an 
organization composed of university student unions, organized a 
weeklong class boycott starting on September 22, 2014; on the 
night of September 26, protesting students scaled a fence to enter 
the forecourt of Hong Kong government headquarters, known as 
Civic Square.222  Police moved in with batons and pepper spray; 
Joshua Wong, along with HKFS leaders Alex Chow and Lester 
Shum, were taken into custody.223  The next day, police fired 
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eighty-seven canisters of teargas at unarmed protesters gathered 
near Civic Square in support of the students.224  In the early hours 
of September 28, Benny Tai declared that Occupy Central had 
begun.225  While the occupation was remarkably peaceful—and 
ended with minimum violence in December—it attracted 
significant international attention and was an embarrassment to the 
Central government.226 
Beijing did not openly intervene but rather left the matter in 
the hands of the Hong Kong government and the local police.227  
However, as demonstrated in the next section, it would later 
launch a concerted campaign against its perceived political 
enemies in Hong Kong, taking full advantage of its increased 
influence over university councils and the more centralized 
structures of governance. 
VI. Beijing’s Retribution: Increased Interference in Hong 
Kong Universities 
An early—and particularly overt—example of Beijing’s 
political purge in Hong Kong was the refusal by HKU’s Council to 
appoint Professor Johannes Chan to a senior administrative 
position.228  In the fall of 2014, HKU appointed a Search 
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Committee (which included the Vice Chancellor) to lead an 
international search to fill five Pro-Vice-Chancellor positions.229  
In November of that year, rumors surfaced that Johannes Chan, the 
former Dean of HKU’s Law Faculty, was a candidate for the 
position of Pro-Vice-Chancellor for academic staffing and 
resources.230  There are many reasons why the local and central 
governments would not have been happy with this choice.  
Johannes Chan had been a founding member of the Article 23 
Concern Group, which had helped to raise public awareness 
concerning the national security legislation, as discussed in Part III 
above.  That organization later evolved into the “Article 45 
Concern Group,” which was devoted to studying democracy 
proposals.231  Over the years, Johannes Chan had also joined other 
moderate pro-democracy organizations, including the Civic 
Commission on Democratic Reform and “Hong Kong 2020,” an 
organization dedicated to political reforms in the territory.232  
Moreover, while Professor Chan himself was not involved in 
Occupy Central, some pro-Beijing forces blamed him for it, 
because he was Dean of the Law Faculty when his colleague, 
Benny Tai, began to plan Occupy Central.233  In a sign of Beijing’s 
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discontent, the Wen Wei Po, a Hong Kong-based Communist Party 
mouthpiece, began publishing articles that were highly critical of 
Chan.234  This did not deter the Search Committee, which 
unanimously recommended Chan’s appointment in December 
2014.235 
However, the Search Committee’s recommendation needed to 
be confirmed by HKU’s Council and the smear campaign against 
Professor Chan continued.  In January 2015 the pro-Beijing media 
obtained a leaked copy of a University Grants Committee report, 
and claimed that it provided evidence that HKU Law Faculty’s 
research performance had declined during Chan’s deanship, 
allegedly due to his involvement in politics.236  The next month, 
Sophia Kao, a top advisor to Chief Executive C.Y. Leung, 
admitted that she had discussed Chan’s fitness for the Pro-Vice-
Chancellorship with unnamed persons, raising suspicions that the 
Chief Executive opposed Chan’s appointment.237 
In June 2015, perhaps due to governmental pressure, the HKU 
Council had not voted on whether to appoint Chan as Pro-Vice-
Chancellor.  Instead, it voted to delay the decision—again—until a 
new provost was appointed.238  This purported explanation drew 
considerable skepticism,239 not least because the absence of a 
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provost had not prevented the Council from filling the other four 
Pro-Vice-Chancellorships.240 The Council’s continued 
prevarication prompted students to storm the next Council meeting 
in July of 2015.241  The student body was not alone in its outrage. 
The HKU Convocation (a body composed of staff and alumni) 
convened an emergency meeting on September 1, 2015; at that 
meeting it overwhelmingly voted in favor of Chan’s immediate 
appointment.242  Despite widespread opprobrium, the Council 
voted against Chan’s appointment on September 29, 2015, giving 
no official statement of reasons other than the “best interests” of 
HKU.243  To our knowledge, this is the first time in HKU’s history 
that the HKU Council has rejected a recommendation of a Search 
Committee.244 
Two particular features of the media campaign against Chan 
bear mentioning.  First, the attacks were based at least in part on a 
UGC report leaked to the pro-Beijing press, suggesting an attempt 
by a UGC insider to target Chan.245  Second, the extent of the 
smear campaign against Chan was unprecedented.  Between 
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with fellow Hong Kong-based Party mouthpiece Ta Kung Pao, 
released nearly 350 articles vilifying Chan, an average of more 
than one article a day.246  Both of these features suggest a 
coordinated campaign to target Chan. 
More significantly, the “reasons” given by Council members 
for rejecting Chan strongly suggest that Chan was a target for 
political retribution.  The Council officially gave no reasons for 
voting against Chan’s appointment.  However, the statements 
made by Council members against Chan were subsequently 
disclosed by whistle-blower and undergraduate Council 
representative Billy Fung,247 as well as in a series of leaked audio 
recordings of Council proceedings.248  The reasons given included 
Chan being a “nice guy” who held no doctoral degree—a rarity in 
Hong Kong legal academia,249 and that a Google Scholar search 
showed that Chan’s research had only been searched—as opposed 
to cited—“four times in the last five years.”250  Most bizarrely of 
all, Council member Lo Chung-mau complained that Chan did not 
show sympathy after Lo fell during the altercation at the Council 
meeting in July 2015.251 
The chain of events leading to the Council’s vote against Chan 
has far-reaching implications for academic freedom within Hong 
Kong.  Chan’s stature within the Hong Kong legal community—as 
an eminent and engaged scholar of public law, and as the city’s 
first, and so far only, Honorary Senior Counsel—should have been 
beyond question.252  As a result, the vote against him—and 
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comments from Council members questioning his credentials and 
his probity—have been widely seen as part of a campaign of 
retribution against academics with pro-democracy views, 
especially at HKU.253  In particular, Chan appears to have been 
singled out for vilification because he was Dean when Benny Tai 
began planning Occupy Central and did not prevent his colleague 
from serving as one of the chief organizers of the campaign.254 
Chan’s fate also reflects the impact of institutional shifts in 
Hong Kong’s higher education landscape.  Following reports both 
by the University Grants Committee and by the universities 
themselves recommending restructuring,255 university councils—
including the HKU Council—have been restructured to include 
significantly greater lay participation.  Yet the Chief Executive’s 
role as ex officio Chancellor, and his power to appoint members to 
university councils, has remained unchanged.256  The result has 
been an increasingly hostile political environment for academics in 
Hong Kong.  It is particularly worrying that the HKU Council 
reacted to revelations about its “reasons” for rejecting Chan by 
seeking to discredit whistle-blowers and suppress evidence;257 this 
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provides a stark contrast to the public inquiry that the Council 
ordered during the Robert Chung affair in 2000.258 
Johannes Chan is not the only academic who has been affected 
by these developments.  A number of academics at HKU, 
including the Vice Chancellor, have reported that their email 
accounts have been hacked.259  The clear purpose of the hacking is 
to allow the pro-Beijing press to search for evidence that might be 
used to tarnish the reputations of academics who are perceived as 
being “pro-democracy.”  For example, Benny Tai’s HKU email 
account was hacked in 2014 and the pro-Beijing press 
subsequently used the emails to claim that Tai had accepted 
“anonymous” donations to HKU in 2013 and then “funneled” the 
money to political campaigns, such as Occupy Central.260  Benny 
Tai refuted these allegations, maintaining that he only introduced a 
donor to HKU (who was later revealed to be Reverend Chu) and 
that the money did not flow to Occupy Central but rather was 
given to three units on campus (the Law Faculty, the School of 
Humanities, and the Public Opinion Programme) to support a 
variety of research and education projects related to constitutional 
development.261  In the opinion of Professor Chow Shew-Ping (the 
Pro Vice-Chancellor in charge of fundraising at the time), the 
donations themselves were not problematic in that they came from 
a reputable local citizen who wished to support on-going academic 
activities.262 
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Nonetheless, the Secretary for Education wrote to HKU’s 
management and Council “repeatedly” to request that HKU 
conduct a thorough investigation into Tai; these letters have never 
been publicly disclosed but have been reported in the press and the 
local legislature and constitute a serious interference by the 
government in university governance.263  HKU’s Council 
subsequently did order a full investigation by an Audit Committee.  
The investigation focused on: (1) the source of the donations, (2) 
how the donations were used, and (3) whether Benny Tai or other 
HKU employees violated any HKU regulations or policies.264 
The Audit Committee’s report (consisting of thirty pages plus 
an additional twenty pages of appendices) is very detailed.265  It 
concluded that the donor introduced by Benny Tai was reputable 
and that the donations funded legitimate academic activities (e.g. 
public forums on constitutional law, and referendums conducted 
by HKU’s Opinion Poll Programme).266  It did identify a number 
of procedural problems but stressed that this was at least partly due 
to a lack of clear guidelines and procedures regarding the 
acceptance, utilization, and reporting of donations at HKU.267 
With regard to Benny Tai, the most serious findings by the 
Audit Committee were: (1) that he re-assigned a research assistant 
from one project to other projects that were being funded by the 
same donor, a deviation from HKU guidelines;268 and (2) that he 
took too long (approximately six weeks) to reveal the identity of 
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the donor after HKU’s Development and Alumni Affairs Office 
(“DAAO”) requested the information.269  The Audit Committee 
concluded that this “seeming reluctance” by Tai fell short “of the 
standards of behavior expected of an academic introducing donors 
to the University.”270  Tai maintains that he was not reluctant but 
needed to first secure permission from the donor (as the donor’s 
original intention was to remain anonymous).271 
The pro-Beijing press was not pleased by the report by the 
Audit Committee, accusing it of failing to “track down” all the 
donations and the connection to Occupy Central.272  In fact, the 
Audit Committee’s report does note, very clearly, that the donor 
was Reverend Chu and the Committee was well aware that Chu 
was a leading participant in Occupy Central.273  But it considered 
Chu to be a reputable citizen and found no evidence that he 
attached any conditions to the donations that would impair HKU’s 
impartiality when carrying out the research and education 
projects.274  Instead, the Audit Committee identified procedural 
errors and found that HKU’s guidelines were far too unclear, 
subject to many different interpretations, and insufficient to guide 
HKU employees.275 
Nonetheless, HKU’s Council ultimately decided to sanction 
Benny Tai by prohibiting him from accepting donations, managing 
researchers, or assuming a managerial position for three years.276  
Some academics believe that these penalties were carefully crafted 
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so as to satisfy the pro-Beijing forces while avoiding any 
substantial punishment.277  One interviewee described the penalties 
as a way to show Beijing that “blood” had been drawn from its 
enemies.  In any event, Tai has strongly objected to the Council’s 
decision, arguing that it was politically motivated and designed to 
punish him for his support, as a private citizen, for Occupy 
Central.  Tai (who has taught Hong Kong administrative law for 
many years) has publicly accused the Council of a number of 
procedural errors in its decision-making process.278  In particular, 
he has pointed out that nothing in the University of Hong Kong 
Ordinance empowers the Council to impose disciplinary penalties 
on academic staff.279  Nor did the Council cite any “pre-existing 
rule or guideline that [Tai] breached or failed to comply with” or 
give him an opportunity to make representations in the Council 
meeting.280  Equally worrying is that HKU’s Council took rather 
extreme measures to curtail public scrutiny of its decisions, not 
only holding closed-door meetings but even directing Tai to keep 
“confidential” the letter informing him of the penalties, except to 
the extent necessary to seek legal advice.281  This constitutes a 
clear attempt to prevent students, other faculty, and the general 
public from critiquing the Council’s decision and the extent to 
which it may reflect government interference. 
At least two other academics (Dr. Robert Chung, who directs 
the Opinion Poll Programme and Professor Daniel Chua, who was 
Dean of the School of Humanities when Reverend Chu donated 
money to that School) have been sanctioned by HKU’s Council in 
a similar process.282  Interestingly, they also were directed to keep 
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the formal notification of penalties confidential unless disclosure 
was for the purpose of obtaining legal advice.  To his credit, Dr. 
Chung challenged the Council’s attempt to gag him.  In a letter 
responding to the Council (conspicuously labeled “not private” 
and “not confidential”), Dr. Chung complained that by “debarring 
individuals concerned from disclosing or discussing the content 
of your letter(s), the Council has effectively denied the public’s 
right to know, and the rights of the individuals concerned to defend 
themselves.”283 
Ironically, the Council that took these steps was the product of 
“reforms” that were intended to ensure that HKU could be 
effectively governed.  Of its twenty-four members, fifteen are 
required to be outsiders—neither students nor employees of 
HKU.284  Of those fifteen, seven—including the Council Chair—
are appointed by the Chief Executive, who is appointed by Beijing 
with no mandate from the people of Hong Kong.285  Six additional 
members are appointed by the Council itself, with the HKU 
Court—a separate advisory body—electing two further 
members.286  A minority of members are now drawn from the 
university itself, representing full-time teaching staff (4), full-time 
non-teaching staff (1), undergraduates (1) and postgraduates (1).287 
The combination of majority outsider representation and the 
Chief Executive’s continued powers of appointment has resulted in 
a university Council that is widely perceived to be politically 
pliant and pro-Beijing.  Indeed, at the time of the vote against 
Johannes Chan’s appointment, six out of twenty-two Council 
members were also members of the National People’s Congress or 
the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Committee—posts that 
signal close political ties with the central government.288  These six 
included former education minister Arthur Li, known for his high-
handed administrative style and a long-standing grudge against 
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HKU.289 
Despite the political fallout from the Johannes Chan saga, the 
Chief Executive has continued to pack university councils with 
members viewed as politically pliant.  In October 2015 he 
appointed four pro-establishment figures to the Council of 
Lingnan University;290 the appointees included former Law 
Society president Junius Ho, who threatened to defund the 
Lingnan University Student Union over a performance of “Fuck 
the Police.”291  Leung also appointed Arthur Li as Chair of the 
HKU Council on December 31, 2015,292 despite an 
overwhelmingly endorsed resolution by HKU’s Convocation that 
Li was unfit for the office.293 
In this atmosphere, it is not surprising that Hong Kong 
academics are far less confident in their freedoms than when 
interviewed a decade ago.  In the past two years, academics from 
various institutions in Hong Kong have come forward and 
complained publicly of politically motivated harassment.  These 
include Joseph Cheng Yu-shek (a former Chair Professor at City 
University of Hong Kong who believes that he has been targeted 
for his work with the Alliance for True Democracy), Dixon Ming 
Sing (an Associate Professor at Hong Kong University of Science 
and Technology, who has criticized China’s repression of Falun 
Gong), and Liz Jackson (an Assistant Professor at HKU who 
perceived negative pressure from senior colleagues concerning her 
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plans to edit a special issue of a journal on the 2014 pro-
democracy protests).294  In confidential interviews, other 
academics in Hong Kong have reported that they fear (or in some 
cases know) that their email accounts have been hacked and that 
they have no confidence that their university will protect them if 
they are subjected to the type of smear campaigns that were waged 
against Johannes Chan and Benny Tai. 
It is, of course, difficult for most academics to prove that they 
have been penalized or that they are being pressured.  Very often, 
the message that one should avoid politically controversial projects 
is delivered in an “off the record” communication.  For example, 
Professor Michael Davis was led to believe, from confidential 
statements by a senior administrator, that his public criticism of 
Beijing’s policy towards Hong Kong may have adversely affected 
his application to extend his employment beyond the normal 
retirement age of sixty at the Chinese University of Hong Kong.295  
Other academics have reported, in confidential interviews, that 
they perceive a heightened level of scrutiny of research and 
community service projects, particularly projects that may be 
funded by foundations from outside Hong Kong.296  Projects that 
might have been considered educational and a valuable community 
service before Occupy Central (such as the “Design Democracy” 
website established by the HKU’s Centre for Comparative and 
Public Law)297 are now easy targets for the pro-China press, which 
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labels such activities as evidence of foreign influence and 
radicalization of Hong Kong’s youth.  It is not surprising that so 
many interviewees told us that they intend to “keep their heads 
down” during these difficult times.298  The authors have also 
spoken with foreign academics who are hesitant to accept 
positions at universities in Hong Kong due to their concerns that 
academic freedom has deteriorated.299  If this trend continues, the 
international reputation of Hong Kong’s universities will be 
seriously undermined. 
Dr. Peter Cunich (a longstanding academic in Hong Kong and 
the author of the leading book on the history of HKU) described 
the current atmosphere in vivid terms.  He observed that threats to 
academic freedom are being discussed in Hong Kong more than at 
any time he could remember and that “[t]he degree to which HKU 
staff are free to express their political beliefs in 2015-16 (as 
opposed to 2014 when we all thought we had those rights 
protected) has been a topic of conversation among junior 
(untenured) staff in particular.”300  Dr. Cunich also admitted that he 
has “advised [his] junior colleagues to keep a low profile and get 
on with their teaching and research.”301  He drew a sharp 
distinction between 2002 and 2016, noting that “the Robert Chung 
Affair seemed to inspire us to fight back, whereas the current 
situation simply fills us all with despair.”302 
VII. The Disapearing Booksellers 
The abduction of Hong Kong-based booksellers is perhaps the 
most potent symbol of Beijing’s determination to bring Hong 
Kong to heel.303  On December 30, 2015, Lee Bo, a British 
national who worked for the Causeway Bay Books bookstore in 
Hong Kong, left for his warehouse to fulfill an unusually large 
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order.304  Causeway Bay Books was popular with certain mainland 
Chinese tourists because it sold books that would be embarrassing 
to the Chinese Communist Party and therefore banned in mainland 
China.305  Lee did not return; his was the fifth disappearance linked 
to Causeway Bay Books and its parent company Mighty Current 
Publishers.306 
Lee’s disappearance sent shock waves through Hong Kong.  
Like his colleague Gui Minhai—a Swedish national who had 
disappeared from Thailand weeks earlier—Lee had been born in 
China, but held a foreign passport.307  However, unlike Gui or their 
other colleagues, Lee had last been seen in Hong Kong.308  
Eyewitnesses claim to have seen Lee bundled into a van outside of 
his warehouse in Chai Wan, presumably by state security agents 
from the mainland, who have no authority to operate within the 
territory of Hong Kong.309  For a Hong Kong public fearful of 
clandestine actions by the mainland security apparatus—ostensibly 
prohibited from operating in Hong Kong under Article 22 of the 
Basic Law—Lee’s disappearance seemed to suggest the worst. 
If Lee’s apparent abduction had set alarm bells ringing in Hong 
Kong, his reappearance weeks later did nothing to calm the Hong 
Kong public.  In a peculiar series of letters faxed from the 
mainland, Lee claimed that he had “voluntarily” returned to the 
mainland to assist in an investigation—an implausible assertion 
because his travel documents remained at home and the Hong 
Kong Immigration Department had no records of his departure.310 
Meanwhile, Lee’s colleague Gui also resurfaced—in a ten-minute 
interview on State-run television, in which he claimed he had 
turned himself in over a fatal drunk-driving accident twelve years 
 
 304 Id. 
 305 See id. 
 306 Id. 
 307 Id. 
 308 Id. 
 309 Kinling Lo, Waiting Game on Booksellers, STANDARD (H.K.) (Jan. 13, 2016), 
http://www.thestandard.com.hk/section-news.php?id=165119 [https://perma.cc/VV27-
N7J5]. 
 310 See Regina Tan & David Tweed, China Confirms Probe of Three Missing Hong 
Kong Booksellers, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 4, 2016), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-02-04/china-confirms-three-missing-
hong-kong-booksellers-under-probe [https://perma.cc/WL5P-BCMX]. 
2016 ACADEMIC FREEDOM AND CRITICAL SPEECH IN HONG KONG 55 
ago.311 Both Lee’s letters and Gui’s interview showed signs of 
coercion.312 Only on February 4, 2016, did mainland Chinese 
authorities officially confirm that the remaining three Mighty 
Current staff were also in their custody.313  In March 2016, Lee Bo 
was permitted to return to Hong Kong, but he did not give a 
credible explanation of how he wound up in custody in mainland 
China.314  Instead, he stated emphatically that he would never 
again publish books that are banned in mainland China.315  This 
statement alone provides clear evidence that Beijing has 
successfully employed fear and intimidation to stifle freedom of 
expression in Hong Kong. 
The abduction of the “Causeway Bay Five,” as they have 
become known, has raised serious questions about the state of 
Hong Kong’s autonomy.  A constitutional right to free speech in 
Hong Kong means nothing if an author or publisher can simply be 
kidnapped and taken across the border for prosecution.  In a video 
that rapidly went viral, student activist Agnes Chow claimed that 
“Hong Kong is not Hong Kong anymore”316—a sentiment echoed 
by legislator Dennis Kwok, who told the New York Times that 
“this sort of stuff is just not supposed to happen in Hong Kong.”317  
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Even political figures who have traditionally toed the Chinese 
Communist Party line have been moved to react.318  Wang 
Zhenmin, dean of Tsinghua Law School and legal affairs chief of 
the Liaison Office, told an academic conference that “[w]e are 
very concerned about the legal case . . . like you,” and that no 
Chinese law enforcement agencies could legally operate in Hong 
Kong.319 
Even prior to the abduction of the Causeway Bay Five, Hong 
Kong’s media environment had shown signs of becoming more 
restrictive.320  Over the preceding years, pro-Beijing tycoons have 
invested heavily in Hong Kong media companies,321 with 
Alibaba’s acquisition of the English-language paper the South 
China Morning Post (albeit from another pro-Beijing owner) 
being the most recent example.322  The Apple Daily, a tabloid 
known for its staunch pro-democracy editorial stance, has suffered 
from companies’ withdrawal of advertising, allegedly under 
pressure from Beijing.323  More significantly, the Liaison Office 
itself indirectly controls three major bookstore chains, as well as a 
plethora of print and online media outlets.324  In its 2015 annual 
report, the Hong Kong Journalists Association cited self-
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censorship as the biggest threat facing media workers in Hong 
Kong, alongside physical threats to journalists.325  Nonetheless, 
books banned on the Mainland—such as the political pot-boilers 
peddled by Causeway Bay Books—remained available in Hong 
Kong, a phenomenon which may have motivated the 
kidnappings.326  The renditions appear to have had the intended 
effect: shortly after Lee Bo’s disappearance, bookstore chain Page 
One—one of the chains not controlled by the Liaison Office—
chose to remove all politically “sensitive” books from its 
shelves.327 
More significantly, Lee Bo’s abduction suggests that Mainland 
state security forces are operating within Hong Kong with new 
levels of brazenness.328  Although Article 22(1) of the Basic Law 
explicitly prohibits Mainland governmental entities from 
interfering in matters within Hong Kong’s autonomy, democratic 
politicians and other critics of Beijing’s rule remain subject to 
surveillance by Mainland security forces within Hong Kong.329  
Religious organizations within Hong Kong have even been warned 
not to proselytize to visitors from the Mainland.330  Although there 
have been reports of previous abductions conducted within Hong 
Kong by State security, such incidents have largely targeted 
wayward Party members, rather than authors of salacious 
literature.331  Lee’s disappearance therefore represents a significant 
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escalation in Beijing’s interference within Hong Kong. 
If the specter of Mainland state security operating in Hong 
Kong—in flagrant breach of the Basic Law—was not sufficiently 
alarming for Hong Kongers, their government’s reaction certainly 
was.  Chief Executive C.Y. Leung initially called for Lee Bo to 
step forward and provide information; he went on to state that 
there was no evidence that state security had been involved in his 
disappearance.332  The police was criticized—by members of the 
force itself—for sending junior officers, rather than the Serious 
Cases squad, to investigate Lee’s abduction.333  Neither the 
police—nor C.Y. Leung himself—publicly pressed Mainland 
authorities for answers, even though the latter were obliged to 
report cases involving Hong Kong residents in custody to their 
Hong Kong counterparts.334  Although we may never know what 
steps the Hong Kong government took behind the scenes, the 
absence of any such steps taken in public raises troubling 
questions about the local government’s ability, or willingness, to 
protect Hong Kong’s autonomy and the rights of its residents. 
VIII. Conclusion 
The developments analyzed in this article are deeply troubling 
and have caused great anxiety, not only for academics but for the 
broader Hong Kong community. The dystopian film “Ten Years,” 
which depicted a Hong Kong in 2025 in which “youth guards” 
attacked a bookshop selling forbidden books, and in which a false-
flag assassination was staged to ensure public support for national 
security legislation, resonated widely among the city’s 
cinemagoers—outperforming even “Star Wars: The Force 
Awakens.”335  Although many residents continue to rely on 
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peaceful means of protest, the Fishball Riots demonstrate that 
some Hong Kongers—in particular those affiliated with the 
“localist” political movements—have lost patience and are 
embracing more militant means of expressing their discontent.336 
While the more violent means of protest seen in the Fishball 
Riots may not gain significant traction among Hong Kongers, 
other ideas espoused by localists have found fertile ground among 
university students.337  The HKU student-run magazine 
Undergrad, criticized by C.Y. Leung in 2015 for arguing that 
Hong Kongers were entitled to self-determination,338 published an 
issue in March 2016 advocating the territory’s independence from 
China.339  In the same month, Joshua Wong announced that he 
would disband Scholarism and set up a new political party to 
contest the legislative elections in September 2016,340 with the 
ultimate goal of seeking a referendum on Hong Kong’s 
independence.341  The growing respectability of localist ideas and 
rhetoric—including the idea that Hong Kong should be 
independent from China altogether—reflect the extent to which 
public faith in “One Country, Two Systems” has been shaken.  
Unfortunately, the central and local governments have responded 
to the localist rhetoric by attempting to restrict discussion of 
independence in public schools342 and by prohibiting individuals 
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who support independence from running for seats in Hong Kong’s 
local legislature.343  These attempts to restrict peaceful advocacy 
almost certainly violate the ICCPR, as well as Hong Kong’s Basic 
Law, and will only further damage public confidence in the “One 
Country, Two Systems” model.  There is also a danger that Beijing 
will use the small independence movement as an excuse to renew 
its demand that Hong Kong implement Article 23 of the Basic 
Law by enacting local criminal laws to prohibit, inter alia, 
secession, sedition, and subversion against the central 
government.344  If the local legislature declined to do so, there is a 
possibility—although hopefully very remote—that the central 
government could invoke Article 18 of the Basic Law and try to 
apply selected national criminal laws in Hong Kong.345 
Against this background, it would be an understatement to say 
that the reputation of Hong Kong—and of its universities—has 
suffered.  Nonetheless, a declaration that “One Country, Two 
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Systems” has failed would be premature—and might become a 
self-fulfilling prophecy.  On the contrary, Hong Kongers—and the 
international community—could do much to restore faith in Hong 
Kong and in the quality of its academic institutions. 
As a signatory to the Joint Declaration, the United Kingdom 
has a legal right, if not an obligation, to monitor Chinese 
compliance with the Joint Declaration.  Although earlier semi-
annual reports by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office have 
rightly been described as “anodyne,”346 the six-monthly report 
issued in February 2016 contained unusually trenchant criticism of 
China regarding Lee Bo, referring to his abduction as a “serious 
breach” of the Joint Declaration.347  In a similar vein, a joint 
statement issued by the United States on behalf of itself and eleven 
other countries, including the U.K., referred to the bookseller 
abductions as “a violation of the high degree of autonomy 
promised Hong Kong under its Basic Law.”348  Such statements, as 
well as international law mechanisms, such as the periodic reviews 
conducted by UN human rights treaty bodies, represent an 
important means of ensuring that Chinese commitments under the 
Joint Declaration—in particular those regarding critical speech and 
academic freedom—are upheld.  It is crucial that the international 
community continues to remind China of its core obligations under 
the Joint Declaration. 
Universities, academic associations, and individual academics 
around the world can also assist by paying close attention to Hong 
Kong and commenting upon any adverse developments in the 
territory.  Hong Kong’s public universities are well funded and the 
government wants them to be viewed as leaders in the global 
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market for higher education.349  It is important that the Hong Kong 
government also realize that decreases in academic freedom and 
educational autonomy will hurt the international reputation of 
Hong Kong’s universities, making it more difficult for them to 
recruit international students and staff, as well as to establish 
exchange programs with foreign universities. 
In this regard, it is encouraging that Scholars at Risk—a 
leading international network of universities supporting academic 
freedom—has taken a strong interest in Hong Kong, drawing 
attention to the rising threats to academic freedom in the 
territory.350 
Substantive reforms to university governance are also needed 
if confidence in Hong Kong’s universities is to be restored.  The 
Chief Executive’s role as Chancellor of publicly-funded 
universities—a major facilitator of political interference in the 
universities—is long overdue for abolition351 and there is 
widespread support for this reform.352  Moreover, in our view, 
even the Hong Kong government would benefit if each university 
were permitted to select its own chancellor or president.  The 
current situation creates unnecessary conflicts, as well as 
unrealistic expectations in Beijing regarding the Chief Executive’s 
influence over academics and student organizations.  It would be 
 
 349 The Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, Hong Kong: 
The Facts, Education (March 2016), 
http://www.gov.hk/en/about/abouthk/factsheets/docs/education.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/U3NT-TBSC]. 
 350 See Scholars at Risk, NYU, http://scholarsatrisk.nyu.edu/ 
[https://perma.cc/WR9H-W387] (last visited May 30, 2016) (showing that for example, 
Scholars at Risk invited two academics from Hong Kong (Robert Chung and Alvin Y.H. 
Cheung) to participate in its 2016 Global Congress, helping to raise awareness of the 
threats to academic freedom in Hong Kong.  Scholars at Risk also is considering holding 
an event on academic freedom in Hong Kong in order to demonstrate its support for 
students and academics in the territory and build solidarity.). 
 351 See Chris Patten, The Closing of the Academic Mind, PROJECT SYNDICATE (Feb. 
22, 2016), https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/academic-freedom-under-
threat-by-chris-patten-2016-02 [https://perma.cc/25L8-YZ8M] (explaining that Chris 
Patten, the last British Governor of Hong Kong, claims that he suggested allowing the 
universities select their own chancellors before the handover, although this has been 
disputed.). 
 352 Academics Vote Against CE Influence on Councils, RADIO TELEVISION HONG 
KONG (Mar. 24, 2016), http://news.rthk.hk/rthk/en/component/k2/1250707-
20160324.htm [https://perma.cc/6AQW-6KQ7].  See also Petersen, Lessons, supra note 
21 (proposing reforms following the Robert Chung affair). 
2016 ACADEMIC FREEDOM AND CRITICAL SPEECH IN HONG KONG 63 
far better for both sides if the Chief Executive were no longer 
viewed—either by society or by Beijing—as even the titular head 
of Hong Kong’s universities. 
Similarly, the universities need to regain control over the 
appointment of the external members of their councils, so that 
universities are governed by individuals with genuine experience 
and expertise in the field, rather than by appointees of the Chief 
Executive who are primarily chosen for their loyalty to him.  It is 
encouraging that the Newby Report on governance also appears to 
recognize that this is a serious problem that needs to be 
addressed.353  The University of Hong Kong has already 
announced that it will undertake a review of its governance 
structure, which will hopefully include an honest assessment of the 
centralization of power that occurred after the Sutherland 
Report.354 
Of course, even if these reforms are adopted, the personal 
political activities of certain Hong Kong academics, on both sides 
of the political spectrum, are likely to be a source of flashpoints in 
the future.  In addition to respecting and protecting academic 
freedom, Hong Kong’s public universities have a duty to account 
for their resources and a legitimate interest in maintaining their 
political neutrality as institutions.  These can be difficult goals to 
balance, even in functioning democracies.  Many universities have 
struggled with whether to require academics to take leave when 
they engage in political activities that will require a major time 
commitment, such as running for office or managing a political 
campaign.355  One of Benny Tai’s chief objections to the decision 
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by HKU’s Council to “discipline him” (regarding his management 
of a donation to HKU) is that the Council never cited any 
particular “pre-existing rule or guideline that [he had] breached or 
failed to comply with.”356  Tai’s objection has merit: if a university 
genuinely believes that it has the authority to set rules or 
guidelines for academics who are politically active, then it should 
establish clear guidelines through a consultative process and then 
apply them in a transparent and politically neutral manner. 
We suggest that Hong Kong academics develop and propose 
their own guidelines, which could expressly recognize and address 
the difference between politically sensitive research and 
commentary, on one hand, and personal political activities that 
may require major time commitments.  Of course, both activities 
enjoy protection under the Basic Law and the ICCPR.  But it 
would not be unreasonable for Hong Kong’s universities to adopt 
politically neutral policies that seek to ensure that academics’ 
personal political activities do not prevent them from fulfilling her 
professional responsibilities. 
Although Hong Kong’s universities face unique political 
pressures, the experiences of other universities—and the support 
of members of the academic community worldwide—will be 
indispensable in rebuilding confidence.  The challenges posed to 
the “One Country, Two Systems” model by Beijing’s increasing 
interference in Hong Kong—including those we describe in this 
article—cannot be overstated.  Although Hong Kongers have 
mounted a robust defense of their city’s autonomy, their efforts 
need greater international attention and support.  Anything less 
might result in changes far more damaging—and permanent—to 
Hong Kong and its universities. 
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